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Preface 
 
Omar Imady 
 
 
      In this issue of Syria Studies, we move to a regional perspective of Syria, 
examining recent political dynamics involving Turkey and Lebanon. Three 
contributions by scholars on Syria are included in this issue, and their findings 
consistently point to just how charged and often hostile Syria’s relationships with its 
neighbours have been. 
 
     In The Syrian Civil War and Turkey-Syria-Iran Relations, Özden Zeynep Oktav 
takes us on a fascinating journey from 2002 when the Justice and Development Party 
came to power, and until the present. Oktav highlights the period when Turkey sought 
a state of ‘zero problem with its neighbours’ and the positive implications this had on 
its relationship with Syria in particular. The advent of the Arab Spring, and the events 
that unfolded in Syria after March 2011, caused a dramatic change in Turkey’s 
foreign policy. In a sense, Turkey failed to appreciate the strong sectarian current that 
underlined Syria’s uprising, and by choosing to strongly side with it, and 
subsequently, to allow Sunni jihadist to pass through its territory, Turkey effectively 
abandoned its zero problem policy and, worse, undermined its own success story by 
alienating its non-Sunni Turkish segments of society. 
 
     In Sunni Islamists in Tripoli and the Asad regime 1966-2014, Tine Gade 
documents just how extensive Syria’s attempt to dominate Lebanon had been since 
the Lebannese civil war. Using Tripoli as a case study, Gade describes how Syria 
succeeded in ‘de-structuring’ the Sunni elite, providing privileges to those willing to 
be co-opted and denying access to economic opportunities to those who resisted its 
hegemony. In either case, the urban Sunni poor were marginalised. In her very 
detailed historical documentation, Gade reminds us that some of the elements of what 
took place in Syria after 2011 were almost rehearsed, though at a much smaller level, 
by Syria in Lebanon. The creation of jihadi salafi groups, through a policy of neglect, 
the utilisation of acts by Sunni jihadis to pave the way towards stronger Syrian 
dominance, and to get rid of serious opponents – all of this was previously 
implemented successfully in Lebanon, Tripoli in particular. 
 
     In Coping with Asad: Lebanese Prime Ministers’ Strategies, Taku Osoegawa 
focuses on Syrian Lebanese relations after the outbreak of the Iraq war in 2003. With 
a special focus on Lebanon’s prime ministers, Rafiq al-Hariri, Fuad Siniora, Sa‘d al-
Syria Studies    
 
vi 
 
Hariri, and Najib Miqati, Taku illustrates the extent to which Lebanon’s ruling elite 
had to compromise vis a vis Syria, and how every move they took that was not 
sanctioned by Syria had a definite price attached to it. Syria, threatened by events in 
Iraq, was adamant at ensuring that Lebanon remained not only loyal, but a card that 
could be effectively used against the West when necessary. The challenge confronting 
Lebanon’s prime ministers was to somehow walk the fine line between protecting 
Lebanon’s sovereignty and interests and fulfilling Syria’s high expectations – 
expectations which became significantly higher after the Syrian uprising. 
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The Syrian Civil War and Turkey-Syria-Iran Relations 
 
Özden Zeynep Oktav♣ 
 
After the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) advent to power in 2002, Turkish 
foreign policy underwent changes which were significant enough to raise question 
marks with its Western allies’ regarding whether Turkey has ceased to be a part of the 
West and international society. Turkish foreign policy makers started to change the 
Cold War mentality, which urged Turkey to have a ‘faith’ in the West without 
questioning its norms, values, policies and conduct. This change of style and 
substance in Turkish foreign policy became most evident with the improving of 
relations with Syria and Iran who had uneasy or hostile relations with the West. 
However, with the outburst of the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Turkey was caught 
off guard and the mass demonstrations on the Arab streets forced Ankara to reshape 
its foreign policy calculations in the Arab world. Put differently, the Arab spring 
became a litmus test for Ankara’s policies of playing to the Arab streets as well as its 
relations with Syria and Iran. While it lent quick support for popular movements in 
Tunisia and Egypt, where Turkish investments were relatively limited, Ankara’s first 
reaction to the uprising in Syria, where Turkish economic and political investments 
were both substantial, was more cautious and it prioritised stability and gradual 
reform. However, Ankara gradually reversed its policy and ended up calling for 
Asad’s overthrow; moreover, as against its early distancing of Turkey from the West, 
Ankara now sought to enlist the West in dealing with the Syrian regime. 
Apprehensions of Turkey’s ambitions vis-ᾲ-vis Syria’s civil war increased 
significantly because of its policy of activism which lent support to Muslim 
Brotherhood which dominated the Syrian National Council, the opposition coalition 
against the Asad regime. Turkey was seen or portrayed as a country following pro 
Sunni policies especially by the West. 
                                                
♣ This article was written within the framwork of a scholarship granted by The Scientific and 
Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK)  2219 BIDEB, Ankara, Turkey. 
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 After a brief survey of improving relations with Syria and Iran, this article sets out 
to examine the triangle of Turkey-Syria-Iran relations after the outburst of Syria’s 
civil war, focusing on the following questions: What were the reasons for Turkey’s 
move to cooperate with the West in dealing with the Syrian crisis in spite of it 
sacrificing, in the process, its good neighborhood relations with both Syria and Iran?  
What is the impact of the Syrian crisis on Turkey-Iran relations? What were the 
priorities and the miscalculations of Ankara in dealing with problems stemming from 
Syria’s civil war? In addition, the article will discuss the duality and ambivalence of 
Turkey-Iran relations which increasingly become evident after the significant changes 
taking place in the region such as the advance of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-
Sham (ISIS) in Iraq’s Western provinces and Turkey becoming the biggest ally of the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), breaking in this respect not only from Iran and 
Iraq but also the United States. The reasons why Turkey and Iran maintain cordial 
relations in the aftermath of the Syrian crisis despite so many divergences of interests 
will also be among the concerns of the study.  
 
Ups and Downs in Turkey’s Relations with Syria and Iran 
In parallel with Turkey’s post 2002 tilting towards regional alliances as an alternative 
to relations with global actors, principally the United States and the European Union, 
Turkey adopted a bridge country role between East and West so as to balance its 
relations between the West/Israel on one hand and Syria/Iran on the other. However, 
with the renewed hostilities in Gaza at the end of 2008, Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdoğan who felt a ‘sense of betrayal’ by Israel after his mediating efforts between 
Israel and Syria employed very harsh rhetoric towards Israel. This marked a new era 
in Turkish foreign policy because Ankara, made it evident that it dropped its previous 
balancing policy between the East and the West. Instead, it would prioritise “zero-
problems” with its regional neighbours. 
 
Deepening Economic Relations with Syria and Iran 
Ankara had signed 51 protocols with Syria by March 2010. 1  This was a 
groundbreaking development in bilateral relations because those protocols, which are 
                                                
1 With the September 16, 2009 Treaty, visa requirements were lifted and the first ministerial meeting 
of  the Turkey-Syria High Level Strategic Cooperation Council which was held with the participation 
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based on the slogan of “common destiny, history and future,” (“Al-qadar al-
mushtarak, Ettarikh al-mushtarak, Al-mustaqbal al-mushtarak”) aimed at economic 
integration and at the same time inflamed a hot debate concerning Turkey’s shift of 
axis.  Erdoğan, “referring to the ongoing debates as to whether Turkey was shifting its 
axis in foreign policy, said: “the focus is not shifting but rather the focus of Turkish 
foreign policy is normalizing.” (Tur 2010) Turkish officials emphasised that it was 
trade, rather than politics, which determined the new contours of Turkish foreign 
policy. For example, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu commented that the lifting 
of visas with Syria as “the first step of turning economic cooperation into economic 
unity” (Gürcanlı 2009). In a similar vein, Turkey tried to create a common free trade 
area by negotiating High Level Strategic Cooperation Councils with Jordan, Iraq and 
Lebanon as well as Syria. In parallel with increasing efforts to enhance trade relations 
with Syria, Ankara also increased its trade volume with Iran to $ 10 billion annually. 
 Not only did Turkey’s exports to Iran double, but also Turkey became quite 
dependent on Iranian oil and gas2 (Associated Press 2009).  Exports to Iran rose more 
than seven-fold, from $300 million to $2 billion, between 2002-2009 (TSIDICG 
2010, 6). Turkey’s efforts, together with Brazil, to prevent the application of UN 
sanctions on Iran in 2010, should be read against this background. Ankara’s 
increasing trade relations with Iran has become completely incompatible with the US 
policy of bringing Iran to heel.  The mutual distrust between Ankara and Washington 
became more evident as the US pressured Turkey to put sanctions into effect. 
Washington was increasingly uneasy about the probability that Turkey could emerge 
as a new safety net for Iranian business as the Turkish government insisted that it 
would abide by UN sanctions but not the more sweeping restrictions imposed on 
Tehran by the US and the European Union (Khalaf and Strauss 2010). Ankara’s 
reluctance to apply the sanctions of individual countries and Turkish official circles’ 
suspicions concerning the application of sanctions by EU and American companies 
manifest Turkey’s distrust of the West and its enthusiasm to be an independent 
regional actor. 
 
                                                                                                                                      
of ten ministers  on October 13, 2009 aimed exchange on  trade, development and education (Ayhan 
2009, 30; Turkish NY 2009). 
2 “Turkey receives 18 million cubic meters per day from Iran, making Iran the second largest supplier 
of gas to Turkey after Russia” (Associated Press 2009). 
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Setbacks to Turkey’s Zero-Problems Policy 
Towards the end of 2010, however, two developments clarified the limits of Turkey’s 
capability of continuing its good neighborhood policy and being an independent actor 
in the international system dominated by the United States. One was the deployment 
of the missile defense system under NATO’s command on Turkish territory and of 
the early warning radar system in Malatya Kürecik on the 19-20 November 2010.3  
Turkey’s consent to participate in a defense mechanism that was believed by many to 
be against Iran, was perceived as an example of the JDP Government’s difficulty of 
following good neighborhood relations at the expense of its relations with the global 
actors, especially the United States (Özalp 2010). Although Ankara declared that the 
system did not target Iranian nuclear sites, the US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s 
statement that the purpose of the US radar system to be installed in eastern Turkey 
was to defend against Iranian missiles, inflicted collateral damage on Turkey-Iran 
relations.4 In addition, the arguments concerning the sharing of intelligence between 
Turkey and Israel from the US radar system in Turkey, which is similar to the one in 
Israel’s Negev Desert, further strained Iranian-Turkish relations.5  The Iranian Chief 
of the General Staff’s threatening words6 manifested the damage done to relations 
with Iran. 
 The second development that crystallised the unsustainability of Turkey’s policy 
of balancing between its Western alliance and its good neighbor policy was the 
outburst of the Arab spring. Especially the Libyan rebellion became a litmus test for 
Turkey’s institutional relations with the West. At first, Turkey, a NATO member, 
objected to military interference in Libya, mainly because it would jeopardise 
lucrative construction contracts in Libya and its large investments in the country. 
Turkish president Gül openly stated Ankara’s suspicions concerning the hidden 
                                                
3 Gürsel, K. (2010, November 21). AKP Dış Politikası Lizbon’da İflas Etti. Milliyet. 
4 China Daily, “Panetta to Visit Turkey Over Shield Plan,” 14 Aralık 2011, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2011-12/14/content_14266117.htm Kadri Gürsel, “Füze 
Kalkanının Eğrisi Doğrusu,” Milliyet, October9, 2011. 
5 Metin Münir, İran’ın Erdoğan’a Sunduğu Fırsat, Milliyet, 18 Ekim 2012.  
6 “Turkey will be next in line for violence after Syria if it continues to work on behalf of Western 
interests,” İran “Genel Kurmay Başkanı Hasan Firuzabadi: Sıra Türkiye’ye gelir, “ Star, August 28, 
2012.  
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agenda of the coalition forces whose main partners were the United States and EU.7  
However, in the face of the increasing support given to the Libyan rebels by the 
Western countries, Ankara recalled its ambassador from Tripoli and recognised the 
rebel Transnational National Council. 8 
 
The Syrian Civil War and Turkey 
With the outbreak of Syrian uprisings and the Asad regime’s indifference to Turkey’s 
warnings to stop its crackdown on opposition protests, Ankara took care not to make 
a mistake similar to that in the Libyan case, (of following the same anti western 
policy). Ankara officially declared that it would interfere in what was happening in 
Syria, a dramatic shift from its traditional principle of non-interference in internal 
affairs of a neighboring country. Erdoğan openly stated that what was happening in 
Syria was an internal Turkish matter and he had run out of patience (Bugün 2011). 
 There were three motives behind Ankara’s shift from its non-interference policy 
after the outburst of the Syrian uprisings: first, was to show that Ankara was no 
longer out of the orbit of the West; second, on the assumption that the West would 
rapidly depose Asad as it had done Qaddafi, to assure itself a place at the table that 
would negotiate the new regional order in the post-Asad period, and third, and most 
important of all, because the Syrian civil war would lead to a flood of Syrian refugees 
so as to endanger Turkish-Syrian borders, and would make them a backdoor for 
Kurdish terrorism. 
 Ankara firmly believed that a political transition from the Asad regime was 
essential to resolving the conflict. Turkey, hoping to bring the regime to the 
negotiating table, empowered Syrian opposition elements, allowing them to organise 
and convene in Turkey, as well as hosting defectors from the Syrian military and 
                                                
7 Turkish president Abdullah Gül stated on a TV channel: “some coalition governments have ulterior 
motives and Libya could be "looted" as Iraq had been. Because the aim (of coalition forces) is not the 
liberation of the Libyan people. There are hidden agendas and differing interests”,2011, TV 24. 23 
March. Gül: Libya'yla ilgili bazı ülkeler fırsatçılık içinde. Retrieved May 14, 2011, from TV 24: 
viewed  22 December 2012,  <http://www.yirmidort.tv/dunya/gul-libya-yla-ilgili-bazi-ulkeler-
firsatcilik-icinde-haber-27719.htm> 
8 Habibi N. & W. Walker, J. 2011, ‘Turkey’s Grand Miscalculation on Libya’, 6 March, Boston.com, 
viewed 18 December 2012, 
<http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/blogs/the_angle/2011/03/turkeys_grand_m.ht
ml> 
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reportedly allowing the Free Syrian Army to set up their headquarters in the south 
east of the country.9 In addition, Ankara, aiming to strangle Syria’s economy and 
severely diminish the power of the Asad government, decided to freeze assets of 
officials involved in the government's crackdown on the uprising, suspended its ties 
with the nation's central bank and banned all military sales.10 Turkey also helped 
forge an international “Friends of Syria” coalition to secure regime change. All these 
efforts, however, were ineffective and moreover deepened Turkey’s mistrust of its 
Western allies, the EU and the United States who followed low profile policies 
towards Syria. 
 First of all, Ankara understood that Washington was not willing to shoulder 
responsibility for the Syrian crisis and take bold initiatives such as setting up a 
"buffer zone" inside Syria to protect refugees fleeing President Bashar al-Asad's 
forces, which would have entailed direct intervention in the year-long revolt.11 
 Second, that the UN and Washington would not favor a military solution became 
evident towards the end of the first anniversary of the Syrian uprising. Turkey was 
disappointed by “the negligent U.S. attitude toward the Syrian regime, and the fact 
that Washington has not offered diplomatic, political, financial, or logistical support 
to the revolution in equal measure to what Russia has given the Syrian regime.”12 
 Thus, a hot debate was inflamed in Turkish media whether Turkey was left alone 
by international society in its struggle against the Syrian regime, which had 
committed crimes against civilians. 13  The lack of international consensus 14 and 
Russia’s standing by Asad “to rebuff what it sees as Western plots to induce regime 
                                                
9 Nuh Yılmaz, Syria: The View from Turkey,  European Council on Foreign Relations, June 19, 2013, 
http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_syria_the_view_from_turkey139 
 
11 Asli Aydintasbas, “Davutoglu’ndan ABD’ye: Humus Sarajevo Olmasin”, Milliyet, February 13, 
2012.  
12 Zagros Osman, “Syrian revolution and Washington’s Miscalculations”, Fıkra Forum, May 17, 2012, 
accessible at http://fikraforum.org/?p=2241  
13 Semih Idiz, “Turkiye Suriye’de Yalniz Kalmamali”, Milliyet, March 31, 2012. “Türkiye Stratejisinde 
Yollar Ayriliyor, Turkiye’nin Planina Veto”, Milliyet, March 25, 2012. 
14 “Ankara accused the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) of indirectly supporting the 
oppression of the Syrian people by failing to unite on Syria.” Semih Idiz, “Ankara BM’nin Suriye 
Surecine Karsi Soguk”, Milliyet, March 26, 2012.
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change in countries friendly to Russia had a negative impact on Turkey’s efforts to 
realise regime change in Syria.”15 Partly due to the increasing critiques in the Turkish 
media that Turkey was left alone and that it had pushed for a military intervention by 
the United States against Syria,16 top Turkish officials declared at the beginning of the 
second year of the Uprising that Turkey would not interfere in the Syrian uprising 
militarily; instead, they would seek a solution based on diplomacy that would include 
Iran, China and Russia. 17  Thus, in parallel with its increasing disappointment 
regarding Washington’s passive role towards Syria, NATO’s inactivity 18  and 
Moscow’s blocking of United Nations moves, Ankara made serious modifications of 
its Syria policy and initiated the “triple negotiation system”19 which would bring 
together Turkey, Egypt and Iran; Turkey, Russia and Iran; and Turkey, Egypt and 
Saudi Arabia to work separately toward a solution in Syria. The involvement of 
Russia and Iran not only made it clear that Asad's regime, if not Asad, would have a 
place at the negotiating table but also made it evident that Turkey was seeking 
alliances alternative to the Western one to find a diplomatic solution to the war. This 
change in Ankara’s policy was owing, not only to the realization that the West would 
not intervene, but also that a unilateral Turkish military intervention in Syria would 
be costly since Asad had dual Russo-Iranian support. Instead, Ankara sought 
agreements with Russia and Iran to be able to ensure its border security in the face of 
                                                
15 Erol Cebeci and Kadir Üstün, “The Syrian Quagmire: What is Holding Turkey Back?”, Insight 
Turkey, Vol. 14, No.2, 2012, p. 20. 
16 Can Dundar, “Sam Amca Seni Iteliyor”, Milliyet, April 12, 2012. For example, Hillary Clinton 
declared ‘we expect the regime change process in Syria will be realised without violence under the 
leadership of the Arab League and Turkey’ (Hürriyet 20 November 2011). 
17 “For example, Turkish President, Gul stated that Turkey favored a solution based on diplomacy and 
opposed any foreign intervention to Syria,”“BM’nin Son Kararını Tasvip Etmiyoruz”, Hurriyet, March 
25, 2012 and Semih Idiz, “Ankara’nin Kafasi Suriye Konusunda Karisikk Gorunuyor”, Milliyet, March 
10, 2012. 
18 “Rasmussen said the Western alliance had no intention of intervening in Syria even in the event of a 
U.N. mandate to protect civilians, and urged Middle East countries to find a way to end the spiraling 
violence.” Reuters, NATO to Stay out of Syria Even If UN Mandate Emerges, February 17, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/us-syria-nato-idUSTRE81G0ZF20120217 accessed 12 Oct. 
2013 
19 Semih İdiz, Turkey’s New Strategy could Broker Force, Almonitor, October 20, 2012, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/ar/contents/articles/politics/2012/10/vision-and-imagination-
required-over-syria.html accessed 12 October 2013. 
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increasing border violations. Last but not least, Ankara became aware that military 
intervention could lead to internationalization of Turkey’s Kurdish issue. 20 
 However, Turkey, whose ultimate aim was to ensure border stability as well as 
toppling the regime, found that it could not control the spillover of the Syrian conflict. 
As the border violations and explosions on its borders such as those in Ceylanpınar, 
Akçakale and Reyhanlı increased in number and severity. Ankara took further 
measures and declared new engagements rules. According to those rules, “any 
military instruments or troops approaching to the Turkish borders from the Syrian 
side in the form of a threat would be perceived as military threats” and would be 
militarily countered...” 21  Moreover, Ankara found, over time that it had new 
unwelcome neighbours along its 900 km border with Syria. One was the Jihadist 
groups such as Al Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and the 
other was the Democratic Union Party “Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat”, (PYD), the 
Syrian branch of the PKK. 
 
New Neighbours, New Threat Perceptions 
With the emergence of the PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK, and al-Qaeda-
inspired fighters who took advantage of the power vacuum to fight for control of key 
northern Syrian towns, Ankara was exposed to new threats and new accusations. It 
was alleged that Ankara was providing members of radical Islamist groups with 
medical care in Turkish hospitals and supplying them with arms and ammunition, 
because those groups had been fighting against the PYD22 whom Asad promised to 
give autonomy in an area covering six districts in the region, including Haseki, Ras 
al-Ain, Afrin, Darbasiyya, Ainal-Araband, and Kamishli. 23  From Ankara’s 
perspective, at a time when Turkey has been in an effort to make peace with its own 
                                                
20  Unver, H. A. 2012, ‘Turkey’s Syria Calculations: Kurdish Dimension’, Foreign Policy Association, 
22 March. 
21 Kareem Fahim and Sebnem Arsu, Turkey Says It Shot Down Syrian Military Helicopter Flying in Its 
Airspace, The New York Times,  September 16, 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/europe/turkey-syria.html?_r=0 accessed October 13, 2013. 
22 Amberin Zaman, Syrian Kurdish Leader Urges Turkey  To End Support for Salafists, Al Monitor,  
October 9, 2013, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/10/syrian-kurdish-leader-calls-
turkey-shut-down-salafists.html accessed October 13, 2013. 
23 Today’s Zaman, Turkey warns Syrian PYD against seeking autonomy, July 19, 2013. 
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Kurds in Turkey, the PYD’s aspirations to gain autonomy, aiming at a probable 
independent Kurdish state which would have access to the Mediterranean, was 
unacceptable. In a region under PYD control, the PKK would have the ability to 
establish a strong foothold and lead to a serious border security issue for Turkey. 
 In this context, Ankara was accused of turning a blind eye to the presence of 
jihadist groups on Turkish territory and using those groups to suppress the Syrian 
Kurds’ aspirations and not only by the PYD but also by Washington. While the 
Obama administration had encouraged a broad Syrian opposition coalition, in which 
the influence of Islamists would be circumscribed, from Washington’s perspective, 
the Turkish government continued to throw its weight behind the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The Brotherhood dominated the Syrian National Council, which was 
headquartered in Istanbul, and succeeded in eclipsing other groups within the new 
opposition coalition, effectively thwarting the American effort to empower non-
Islamists. 24 
 In a nutshell, the war in Syria assumed a totally different dimension, no longer 
one against a brutal dictator for the sake of democracy, but over whether Syria would 
be an Islamic or secular state. 25 Most important of all, Asad was successful in giving 
the impression that he has been standing against the radical groups in the region. The 
arrival of Jihadists not only strengthened Asad’s hand in international platforms but 
also has provided one of the incentives for Washington and Tehran to start searching 
for common ground. Tehran was concerned about al-Qaida-affiliated groups in Syria 
as much as the United States is. 
 Ankara's approach to international politics in the Middle East was increasingly 
isolating Turkey in international platforms. This was most evident when Erdoğan 
reacted furiously against both the West and the Arab states over the military coup that 
ousted Egypt's first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi, in early July 
2013.26 According to some analysts, because Turkish foreign policy is a “purely 
                                                
24 Halil M. Karaveli, Turkey, the Unelpful Ally, February 27, 2013,  The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/27/opinion/turkey-the-unhelpful-ally.html?_r=0 accessed 14 Oct. 
25 Semih Idiz, “Jihadists Alter the Syrian Equation, October 3, 2013, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/jihadists-alter-the-syrian-
equation.aspx?pageID=449&nID=55566&NewsCatID=416 
26 Erdoğan was puzzled at Saudi officials’ support for the Egyptian coup and said: “How could a 
country claiming to uphold Islam a nd Sharia support the overthrow of an elected Islamist president 
who came to power after fair elections?” Al-Rasheed, M. 2013, ‘Saudi Arabia and Turkey Falter Over 
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ethics-based” rather than an “the interest based” one, it should be defined as a 
“precious loneliness/worthy solitude.” This precious loneliness 27 of Turkey became 
yet more visible when the Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov and US Secretary 
of State John Kerry reached an agreement to secure and eliminate Syria's chemical 
weapons, although Obama had clearly declared that the United States would apply 
force if chemical weapons were used in the Syrian conflict, thereby averting an attack 
on Syria that Turkey had anticipated.28 Turkey welcomed the UNSC resolution 
adopted in New York and the US-Russian agreement on the destruction of chemical 
weapons, but it came as a shock for Ankara that Asad was not obliged to quit his 
position immediately although approximately 1300 Syrian people were gassed in 
August 2013. 29  Thus, Bashar al-Asad not only managed to stay in power but also 
averted a US attack with the help of Russian inspired diplomatic efforts. 
 In addition, the lack of any reference in the UN resolution to refugees or the 
humanitarian situation in the neighboring countries deepened Turkey’s existing 
uneasiness about the negligent attitude of the international community towards 
Turkey’s refugee problem.30  As the number of Syrian refugees which Turkey hosted 
in 21 refugee camps and the cost of those refugees as a result of Turkey’s open door 
policy increased with each passing day, Ankara demanded that the international 
community – and especially the European Union and the United States – be much 
                                                                                                                                      
Egypt’, Al-Monitor, 20 August, viewed 14 September 2013,    <http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/saudi-arabia-turkey-strained-relations.html> 
27 Adilgazi, L. 2013, ‘ ‘Zero Problems’ Policy Supplanted by ‘Precious Loneliness’ Approach’, 
Today’s Zaman, 25 August, viewed 14 September 2013,   <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-
324415-zero-problems-policy-supplanted-by-precious-loneliness-approach.html> 
28 Chris Good, President Obama’s Red Line; What He Actually Said about Syria and Chemical 
Weapons, ABC News, August 26, 2013,  http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/08/president-
obamas-red-line-what-he-actually-said-about-syria-and-chemical-weapons/ accessed 15 Oct. 2013. 
29 Dominic Evans and Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Syria Gas Kills Hundreds Security Council Meets, 
Reuters, August 21, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/21/us-syria-crisis-
idUSBRE97K0EL20130821 accessed 15 Oct 2013. 
30 Today’s Zaman, Davutoğlu Disappointed by UN Security Council Resolution,  September 30, 2013, 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-327814-davutoglu-disappointed-by-un-security-council-
resolution.html accessed 19 Oct 2013. 
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more forthcoming in funding humanitarian assistance programs and live up to pledges 
made in the context of the UN’s Syria Regional Response Plan.31 
 In sum, Ankara made a lot of miscalculations in formulating its policies towards 
Syria by putting all its chips on a ‘non-Asad scenario’. For example, Turkey did not 
foresee that Washington would not favor a more Islamised Syria and would not 
consent to Asad’s replacement by the Muslim Brotherhood; especially after 
Mohammed Morsi came to power in Egypt this would have sandwiched Israel 
between two Ikhwan ruled countries, Egypt and Syria. Asad’s fall and his 
replacement by Islamist rule would not only endanger the security of Israel but also 
lead to radical groups’ control of chemical weapons existing in Syria.  In addition, in 
the post Iraqi war period, the Obama Administration did not want to get into another 
Middle East quagmire while struggling with its own economic problems in domestic 
politics. Another important miscalculation of Turkey concerned the power of anti 
Ikhwan regional countries such as Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and United Arab Emirates. 
Erdogan, while voicing allegations that it was Israel that organised and supported the 
military coup in Egypt, publically disregarded the fact that Saudi Arabia also 
supported the army against the Ikhwan.32 
 Lastly, Ankara did not take into account that Russia would not give up supporting 
Syria, for several reasons. First, Syria is the only country where Moscow enjoys a 
naval outlet on the Mediterranean. Russia currently has a naval installation in Tartus, 
which is strategically important and Russia’s last foreign military base outside the 
former Soviet Union.  Second, the Syrian uprising has clearly shown that Russia still 
acts in accordance with a Cold War mentality in seeking to prevent Syria from falling 
under Western control. Most important of all, Ankara did not foresee that Iran would 
prove so tenacious in supporting the Asad regime in Syria in an attempt to protect the 
“Shiite crescent,” to support a valuable ally in the Arab world, and as a convenient 
conduit to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The divergence between Turkey and Iran over 
Syria acquired a sectarian dimension: Tehran viewed the rebellion against the Asad 
regime as a Sunni uprising against minority Alawites, an outlier sect of Shi’ism, 
whereas Ankara backed a Sunni party, the Muslim Brotherhood. However, Ankara 
                                                
31 Kemal Kirişçi, Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Limits of an Open Door Policy, Brookings, June 27, 
2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/27-syrian-refugees-in-turkey-kirisci 
acessed 19 oct. 2013. 
32 Serpil Çevikcan, Suriye, Mısır, Görünen Köy,  Milliyet, August 24, 2013. 
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and Tehran are nevertheless both pragmatic enough to manage their relationship and 
avoid falling into enmity over the crisis in Syria. 
 
 
The Syrian Civil War and Turkey-Iran Relations 
Continuing amity in Turkey-Iran relations has rested on deepened interdependence on 
the basis of trade, security and politics to some extent mainly rooted in the expansion 
of relations throughout the 2000s. Erdoğan and Iranian President Ahmed-i Nejad, 
being reluctant to damage these relations, stated, in an October 2012 meeting in 
Azerbaijan, that they would seek ways of cooperation over the Syrian issue. While 
Tehran asked that Ankara broker negotiations between moderates from the opposition 
groups and the Asad regime, 33 Ankara wanted Iran to take a place in two different 
negotiating groups, one involving Turkey, Egypt and Iran, and one involving Turkey, 
Russia and Iran. Erdoğan openly stated his positive view about Iran’s cooperation in 
finding a solution to the Syrian issue.34 
 From Tehran’s perspective, the fear of encirclement by hostile neighboring 
countries is the main motive behind its policy of maintaining relations with Ankara 
and thus to secure its frontier with Turkey. Apart from the patriot missiles deployed 
on Turkish territories, Washington’s deployment of missiles in Qatar set alarm bells 
ringing in Tehran.  Not only did the expanded American military presence in the Gulf 
exacerbate Iranian security concerns, but developments such as bilateral visits 
between the Turkish and Saudi Chiefs of Staff in November 2012 and the signing of a 
military agreement between Turkey and Qatar in July 2012 also made Tehran fear 
that a new Sunni axis was being formed against it by neighboring countries.35 To 
avert this, Tehran wanted not only to maintain a cordial relationship with Turkey but 
also to mend relations with Egypt under Morsi; Ahmed-i Nejad became the first 
Iranian president to visit Egypt, an important US ally, since the Islamic revolution.36 
                                                
33 “İran: Suriye Konusunda Türkiye’yle Uyumluyuz,” Milliyet, 8 Ocak 2013. 
34 “Esad’a Karşı İran’ı İşbirliğine Çağırdı,”  Milliyet, 17 Ekim 2012. 
35 Semih İdiz, “Turkey’s Secterian War over Syria and Iraq,”  Al-Monitor Turkey,, January 4, 2013 
36 “Mısır Dışişleri Bakanı Kemal Amr, ziyaret esnasında   Körfez ülkelerinin güvenliği Mısır’ın kırmızı 
çizgisi olduğunu söyleyerek İran’la yakınlaşma olmadığı sinyalini vermiştir.” İran Lideri İlk Kez 
Mısır’da, Milliyet, 6 Şubat 2013. 
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 Secondly, Iran could not afford to lose the Turkish gas market, which became 
increasingly important at a time when the Iranian economy was under the severest 
sanctions ever applied in its history. Because both sides developed relatively 
interdependent trade and energy relations throughout the 2000s, officials from Iran 
and Turkey were determined to sustain trade relations despite diverging interests in 
Syria and Iraq. For example, in October 2012, Erdoğan stated at a meeting with 
Iranian vice-president, Mohammed Reza Rahimi, that the volume of Iranian-Turkish 
trade would increase from 16.5 billion dollar to 30 billion dollar.37  This statement is 
noteworthy with respect to understanding Ankara’s uneasiness about the sanctions 
applied on Iran by the UN since 2010. The sanctions obstructed purchase of Iranian 
natural gas, which provided 20% of Turkey’s natural gas needs. In addition, Turkish 
business circles were increasingly uneasy about the double standards applied by the 
United States, which they believed, bypassed the sanctions and covertly exported its 
goods to Iran.38 “At the insistence of the Obama administration, in 2012 Turkey 
reduced its imports of oil from Iran; at the same time, however, it began selling gold 
to the country to circumvent the difficulties associated with payments in dollars.”39 
The tension between Turkey and the United States was heightened with Obama’s 
Executive order 13622 prohibiting the export of gold and “other precious metals” to 
the Islamic Republic.40 However, currently, the Obama Administration has declined 
to issue any sanctions pursuant to the order in the face of growing tension between 
Turkey and the United States. Ankara is still Tehran’s largest export market for 
natural gas.” 41 
                                                
37 Seda Kırdar, ABD’nin İran’a Uyguladığı Altın Yaptırımı  ve Olası Sonuçları, Türkiye Ekonomi 
Politikaları Araştırma Vakfı (TEPAV), Nisan 2013, s. 2. 
38 Sabah, “Asıl ABD İran’la Ticareti Kessin,” 1 Aralık 2012. 
39 In fact, Turkey’s gold exports to Iran significantly reduced its balance of payments deficits in the 
first six months of 2012. See Guliyeva and Pak, ‘What’s Iran doing with Turkish Gold?’; and ‘Gold 
Sales to Iran and Economic Slowdown Curb Turkey Trade Deficit’, The Daily Star, 1 August 2012 in 
Barkey, p. 146. 
40 Serkan Demirtaş, Türkiye-ABD Arasında Altın Gerginliği,  BBC Türkçe, 5 Aralık 2012, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/turkce/haberler/2012/12/121205_us_turkey_gold.shtml 
41Robert Zarate, Patrick Christy, FPI Bulletein, Obama and Congress must Max Out Iran Sanctions 
Now,” The Foreign Policy Initiative, May 14, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/content/fpi-
bulletin-obama-and-congress-must-max-out-iran-sanctions%E2%80%94now accessed 24 Oct. 
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 From Turkey’s perspective, a further important reason for maintaining the 
bilateral relations with Iran is its escalating security concerns from the spill over 
effect of the Syrian civil war, which became evident with the attacks on Akçakale, 
Cilvegözü ve Reyhanlı.42  Put differently, at a time when the NATO general secretary 
Rasmussen openly stated, “NATO can not act like the policeman of the world,” 43 
Ankara, whose economy and border security were increasingly under threat because 
of the refugee flood and bomb attacks, could not depend on the West and needed 
diversified relations with its important Iranian neighbor. Despite occasional outbreaks 
of crisis, both sides quickly contained and ameliorated bilateral relations through 
diplomatic channels.  For example, in the face of Iranian Chief of General Staff’s 
threats concerning the patriots missiles deployed on Turkish territories, Davutoglu 
“reassured his Iranian counterpart, Ali-Akbar Salehi, during a joint news conference 
in Tehran in January 2012 that Turkey would never take any step that could 
negatively affect the relations with Iran and he said:  “We will never accept any 
attack on any of our neighbors from our soil. We don't want such a perception of 
threat to exist, especially against Iran.” In return, Salehi put the remarks of the IRGC 
general in context, underlining that “some people, knowingly or not, express views 
without much knowledge and by stepping beyond their responsibilities, and it causes 
misunderstandings.” 44 
 None of this means that the Turkey-Iran bilateral relations are problem- free. On 
the contrary, leaving aside the proxy war in Syria, rivalry over filling the gap in Iraq 
after US withdrawal has affected Turkish-Iranian relations in a negative way. While 
Turkey’s relations with Iraqi Kurdistan improved, especially on the basis of energy 
and trade, thereby strengthening Iraqi Kurdistan’s capacity to act independently of 
Baghdad, Iran promoted its sphere of influence in Baghdad and especially in the 
South of Iraq. The Shiite-based central government is also of crucial importance for 
Iran to maintain its sphere of influence in Syria since Iranian arms flow to Syria take 
place via Iraq. In addition, the Iraqi government supports the Asad regime by hosting 
                                                
42 Reyhanlı’da Katliam: 43 Ölü, Milliyet, 12 Mayıs 2013. Murat yetkin, Suriye Savaşı kapımıza 
Dayandı, Radikal, July 18, 2013. 
43 Reuters, “NATO to Stay out of Syria Even If UN Mandate Emerges”, 17 Şubat 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/17/us-syria-nato-idUSTRE81G0ZF20120217  
44  Arshin Adib-Moghaddam, Turkey & Iran: Islamic Brotherhood or Regional Rivalry?, AlJazeera, 
June 4, 2013, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/reports/2013/05/20135139554264452.htm.  
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visits by Syrian officials, signing pacts to expand business ties and offering political 
support to help the Asad regime to cope with its isolation from other Arab League 
members. Turkey was labeled as "a hostile state" and accused of interfering in the 
internal affairs of Iraq by the Maliki government. Turkey’s rapprochement with the 
Iraqi Kurdistan was perceived as a Turkish plot against the unity of Iraq.  For 
example, that Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan signed a pipeline agreement45 which would 
transfer one million barrel crude oil via the Kirkuk-Yumurtalık pipeline came as a 
shock to the Baghdad government since this agreement was perceived by Maliki as 
Erbil’s breaking away with the central government. 46 
 Another area of competition between Iran and Turkey also become more visible 
after the outburst of the Arab spring. For example, Erdoğan’s growing popularity in 
the Arab street, and his travel to Egypt, Tunisia and Libya five days before the 
opening of Iran’s Islamic Awakening Conference and his message of secular 
democracy were perceived by Tehran as an attempt to undermine Iran’s regional soft 
power.47 Erdoğan’s message was harshly criticised by Tehran on the grounds that 
Turkey’s model of “secular Islam” was a version of western liberal democracy and 
unacceptable for countries going through an “Islamic awakening.” 48 From a different 
angle, Erdoğan’s Arab tour and his words encouraging the Arab streets to be more 
democratised automatically touched the sensitive chords of Iranian political elite 
                                                
45 El Arabiya, Iraqi Kurdistan Poised to Pipe Oil to World via Turkey,”  17 Nisan 2013, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/business/energy/2013/04/17/Iraqi-Kurdistan-poised-to-pipe-oil-to-
world-via-Turkey.html 
46 Denge Azad, Cengiz Çandar: Kürdistan petrolü, Türkiye, Ortadoğu jeopolitiği 24 Nisan 2013. 
47 Hürriyet Daily News, Erdoğan Offers “Arab Spring” neo-Laicism,” September 15, 2011, 
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=erdogan-offers-8216arab-spring8217-
neo-laicism-2011-09-15 accessed 23 Oct. 
48 Henry J. Barkey, Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, vol. 54, no.6, December 2012- January 2013, s. 154. Iran who was caught off guard with the 
outburst of the mass protests in Arab world, sought to find and develop commonalities  between the 
raison d’être of the Iranian state and the protests, therefore described the mass protests as ‘Islamic 
Awakening’ (Bidari-ye Eslami),” Mahan Abedin, “Khamanei Throws the Gauntlet at the West,”  Asia 
Times Online, September 21, 2011. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS__IranAndArabSpri
ng_Rafati.pdf 
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whose survival had been endangered by big mass protests only a couple of years 
previously. 49 
 The beginning of Rouhani’s moderate Iranian diplomacy, however, offered a 
good opportunity for a new beginning with Turkey so as to reduce the existing 
tension stemming from the Syria crisis. Indeed, it had already become apparent that 
Ankara could no longer afford, for various reasons, to continue its policy of putting 
all its chips on a non-Asad scenario. First of all, the possibility that the al-Qaeda-
linked Jabhat al-Nusra and the ISIS could eventually grow too strong to control and 
threaten Turkey prompted Ankara to seek more cooperative relations with Iran. An 
internationalised sectarian conflict on its longest border might stoke a dangerous 
escalation on Turkey’s domestic politics tensions, particularly  the Sunni-Alevi 
divide. In a similar vein, Tehran, shared with Turkey perception of a threat from a 
probable emergence of de facto Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria under the 
leadership of the Democratic Union Party, linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party 
along at least 400 km of the Turkish border. 50 In a nutshell, Turkey, wary of a 
“Pakistanisation” of its border provinces, and Tehran, pressurised on its nuclear 
efforts and its economy by the international community, had incentives to improve 
relations. 
 Two important developments in 2013-2014 seemed likely to further affect 
bilateral relations between the two countries. One was the interim nuclear deal signed 
in Geneva in November 2013 between Iran and the six world powers which mainly 
aimed to normalise Iran’s relations with the outside world. First of all, the Geneva 
agreement gave international recognition to Iran’s right to continue uranium 
enrichment for peaceful purposes and Iran’s economy earned a relief of $ 7 billion. 
While this was welcomed by Ankara, the de facto recognition of Iran’s right to the 
full nuclear fuel cycle came at a time when Turkey’s nuclear energy program was still 
in its early infancy. This will not only elevate Iran’s international prestige but also 
lead to imbalance between the two countries on the energy and security levels. 
                                                
49 Today’s Zaman, “Iran says Turkey’s secular system not suitable for Arab Spring nations,”  
December 13, 2011, http://www.todayszaman.com/news-265659-iran-says-turkeys-secular-system-
not-suitable-for-arab-spring-nations.html accessed 23 Oct, 2013. 
50 Fehim Taştekin, Rouhani Offers Chance to Turkey,  Too,” Al Monitor,  September 26, 2013, 
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/09/rouhani-turkey-opportunity-iran-relations.html 
accessed 23 Oct. 
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 The second was the advance of ISIS to Mosul and Telafer and the accompanying 
exacerbation of the sectarian war in Iraq. Because, after the outbreak of the Syrian 
crisis, Ankara came to believe that an Iranian-led Shiite axis was forming to its South, 
extending from Iraq into Syria, it looked for allies to counter that axis, including the 
KRG some of the GCC states and Iraq’s Sunni Arab population.51 While many 
analysts still accused Turkey of allowing its Syria border to become a two-way 
“jihadist highway” facilitating the passage of thousands of international Sunni 
jihadists to Syria 52 Iran, after the ISIS advance, came to be seen by the US as a 
regional actor that could restore security in Iraq. At a time when a hot debate about 
probable US-Iranian cooperation in tackling advances by Sunni insurgents in Iraq 
started, Turkey’s role in the fight against “terrorism” was sidelined despite its NATO 
membership and alliance with the West. This shows that Turkey’s failure in Syria as 
well as Iraq is mainly due to its pro-Sunni policies which damaged not only its newly 
formulated good neighborhood relations but also provoked its own Sunni-Alawite 
divergence in domestic Turkish politics as evident during the Gezi protests. Iran’s 
rising status as a counterbalancing power against Sunni radicalism and Washington-
Tehran rapprochement over Iraq might come at the expense of Turkey’s role in the 
region. 
 
Conclusion 
Syria had been the jewel in the crown of Davutoglu’s policy of “zero problems with 
neighbors” and the accompanying ambition to substitute Turkish leadership for 
Western over-involvement in the Middle East;’53 as such the, Syrian civil war not 
only devastated Turkey’s zero problem policy but also exposed its limited capability 
to act in the Middle East independently from the West, particularly, the United States. 
 Since the beginning of the new century, Turkey, assuming that the unipolar 
international system was being replaced by a multipolar one, had focused on regional 
policies and improved its relations with Syria and Iran in an unprecedented way. 
                                                
51 Soner Cagatay, Tyler Evans, Turkey’s Changing Relations with Iraq, Kurdistan Up, Baghdad Down, 
Policy Focus 122, October 2012, p.4. 
52 Daniel Pipe, Turkish Support for ISIS, Middle East Forum, June 18, 2014 and  Kadri Gürsel,  
Turkey Paying Price for Jihadist Highway on Border, Al-Monitor, June 12, 2014.  
53 Henri J. Barkey (2012) Turkish–Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring, 
Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 54:6, 151,  DOI: 10.1080/00396338.2012.749639 
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Ankara firmly believed that the pax Americana was ending with major changes in 
international order, such as the rise of China as a global power. In parallel with this, 
Turkey criticised and demanded the reform of the international order in many area 
such as trade, finance, nonproliferation and human rights. 54  Turkey’s growing 
alignment with what Washington deemed to be ‘rogue states,’ Syria and Iran, should 
be read against this background. 
 However, the Arab spring and Syrian revolt exposed Turkey’s misreading of  
regional dynamics, its exaggeration of its own capacity to take a leadership role in the 
region and most important of all, Turkey’s Achilles heals, Kurdish separatism and the 
Sunni-Alevi cleavage.  Syria’s civil war also brought the fragility of Turkish-Iranian 
relations to the surface. Despite the increasing trade and energy relations between the 
two countries, the transformation of the Syrian conflict from one initiated by the 
masses against a dictatorial rule into one between the Sunni jihadists and Alawites/ 
secularists and its spread to Iraq especially after the advance of ISIS, upset the 
balance between the two countries. Both Iran and Turkey appeared to have carved out 
respective spheres of influence at opposite ends of Iraq. Tehran extended its influence 
throughout southern Iraq. Turkey, by contrast, has consolidated its economic and 
political influence in the Kurdish regions of the north at the expense of its relations 
with Baghdad and Tehran. Ankara even went further and remained silent when the 
Iraqi Kurdistan took control of Kirkuk in order to stop the advance of ISIS in the 
region although Kirkuk had traditionally been Turkey’s red line regarding Kurdish 
aggrandizement in Iraq. 
 Only a couple of years ago, following the Arab spring, Turkey was seen as a 
successful country because it demonstrated that democracy and Islam could coexist. 
However the Syrian revolt and its aftermath destroyed Turkey’s popularity in the 
Arab world mainly because of Turkey’s abandoning of its previous policy of 
equidistance between the regions sectarian poles by allowing passages of Sunni 
jihadist groups from Turkey to Syria. Owing to these policies of Ankara, Iran 
achieved a rising status as a counterweight to the spread of Sunni insurgency and 
Asad  remained in power as a leader standing against the radical Jihadist groups  in 
the eyes of the West. 
                                                
54 Murat Yeşiltaş, Global Swing and Turkey, The New Turkey,  February 7, 2013,  
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 The Syrian crisis also crystallised the fragility of Turkey’s relations with the 
West, especially the United States. For example, while conventional wisdom had it 
that the usage of chemical weapon would be a cause for US intervention in the region 
and Turkey was expecting it in Syria, US Secretary of State John Kerry praised 
Bashar Asad because he quickly started the process of destroying his regime's 
chemical weapons arsenal. Apart from this, Turkey was disappointed by the EU’s and 
US’ indifference to Turkey’s struggle with the Syrian refugees whose numbers has 
exceeded over 1.000.000. 
 To sum up, the Syrian crisis and its aftermath have prompted Turkey to modify its 
previous overambitious policies so as to restore its deteriorating image and to deal 
with the consequences of the Syrian crisis, including a sectarian based war in its 
neighborhood, border security, economic problems stemming from a loss of  Arab 
markets, deteriorating relations with Iraq and clashing interests with Iran. All these 
expose the negative impact of the Syrian civil war on Turkey. 
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Sunni Islamists in Tripoli and the Asad regime 1966-2014 
Tine Gade♣ 
 
A city in North Lebanon with 320,310 inhabitants, Tripoli is one of the so-called 
“sensitive” zones where the Syrian war threatens to spread into Lebanon. While the 
Syrian army withdrew from North Lebanon in April 2005, Tripoli’s destiny 
remained intrinsically linked to Syria. This was because of the numerous historical, 
political, family, and economic ties linking the social space of north Lebanon to its 
Syrian hinterland. The demographic composition of the city resembles Syria. 
Tripoli’s population is in majority Sunni Muslim (80.9%) and includes, in addition 
to a Christian minority in decline, the largest Alawi community in Lebanon (8,9 %, 
or 28,525 persons) 1 . This paper analyses the consequences of the Syrian 
intervention and presence in Lebanon on political leadership in Tripoli. It shows 
how the Syrian presence created alliances, conflicts and divisions still present in 
Tripoli today. The main argument is that the Syrian presence in Tripoli de-
structured Sunni leadership in North Lebanon. New Syrian political-economic 
networks emerged, where clients were awarded with political and economic 
influence. Common interests between Tripolitanian businessmen and actors in the 
Syrian military developed during the period of the Syrian presence. Tripoli’s 
political field became more split, between winners and losers of the Syrian 
presence. The losers of the Syrian period included in particular the urban poor, who 
suffered from Syrian repression and from competition from Syrian labourers. This 
led to the disintegration of internal solidarity within Tripoli’s political field, until 
then known for its unity around anti-imperialist and Sunni Islamic norms. Tripoli’s 
                                                
♣ This article has been written owing to the scholarship granted by The Scientific and Technological 
Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK)  2219 BIDEB, Ankara, Turkey. My gratitude is extended 
to Bernard Rougier, Gilles Kepel, Élizabeth Picard, Raymond Hinnebusch, Wladmir Glasman, 
Thomas Pierret, Benjamin White, Andrew Arsan, and Fred Lawson. 
1 Statistics of registered residents in Tripoli (al-Mina included) for 2013, generously put at the 
author’s disposal by Kama Feghali, director of the Lebanese Office of Statistics and Documentation 
and independent consultant. 
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Sunnism had, at least since the struggle against French mandate in the 1920s and 
1930s, constituted one sole actor on the Lebanese scene, calling for Muslim rights 
and re-allocation of state resources to peripheral areas and affirming Lebanon’s 
Arab identity. Rashid Karami, who served as Prime Minister during long periods in 
the Shehabist period, gained large electoral majorities in Tripoli in the 1960s and 
redistributed state resources to Tripolitanians. Karami had a very good working 
relationship with Syria. After 1967, the political scene in Tripoli was fragmented 
between Karami and movements of the Arab nationalist left, including Iraqi 
Ba‘athism and Arafat’s Fatah. The Syrian intervention consolidated and 
accentuated the split in the Sunni population in Tripoli. 
 This chapter first addresses the research literature on the Syrian presence in 
Lebanon and outlines the general background information on Syrian, involvement, 
in particular the motives and interests for the Syrian intervention to Lebanon in 
1976. Secondly, it analyses the transformation within Tripoli’s field of politics 
before, during and following the Syrian intervention (1976). Finally, three 
hypotheses to account for the Syrian determination to control Tripoli and its 
hinterland are considered. The first centres on Tripoli’s Islamists, the second on 
communal motivations, and the third on economic and material gains. 
 
Existing literature  
Despite the insightful lessons North Lebanon can bring to the study of Syro-
Lebanese relations, the region is notoriously understudied. Few in-depth studies 
exist in English or French. The Arabic-language literature on Syrian policies in 
North Lebanon are somewhat more extensive but not until recently. A key problem 
has been the difficulty for foreign scholars to gain access to good primary sources 
in the heavily Syrian-controlled region. The most published scholar on North 
Lebanon, the late Michel Seurat, was abducted in 1985.2 During 1993-2005 period, 
the Lebanese press was subject to heavy restrictions, which made it virtually 
                                                
2 Michel Seurat, ‘Le quartier de Bab Tebbané à Tripoli (Liban). Étude d’une ‘asabiyya urbaine’, in 
l’État de barbarie, Paris: Seuil, 2012, 1989, p. 235-284. 
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impossible for sociologists to analyze political dynamics in North Lebanon in any 
significant detail.3  
 This changed in 2005, after Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. A number of 
Tripolitanian political actors, journalists, and sociologists lifted the veil on the issue 
and published books and a series of articles in the Lebanese press4 about their 
experiences between 1986 and 2005. The main focus was on the Syrian regime’s 
repression of Sunni Islamist movements5 and on the relationship between local 
notables and Syria.6 Although, much of the material was written by actors; not 
observers, and therefore may suffer from inaccuracies and political bias,7 it can be 
                                                
3 A few doctoral dissertations analysed the relationship between Islamist groups in Tripoli and Syria 
in the 1980s. Joumana al-Soufi Richard, Lutte populaire armée. De la désobéissance civile au 
combat pour Dieu (du kifah al musalah au jihad), PhD dissertation, Université de la Sorbonne 
Nouvelle, Paris III, 1988; Dalal Bizri-Bawab, Introduction à l’études des mouvements Islamistes au 
Liban, PhD dissertation, January 1984, École Pratique des hautes études en sciences sociales; “Le 
movement ‘Ibad al-Rahman et ses prolongements à Tripoli”, in Olivier Carré and Paul Dumont 
(eds.), Radicalismes Islamiques. Tome I, Paris: L’Harmattan, 1985, pp. 159-214 and Islamistes, 
parlementaires et libanais. Les interventions à l’Assemblé des élus de la Jama‘a Islaiyya et du Hibz 
Allah (1992-1996), CERMOC, Document No 3, 1999. 
4 ‘Fatfat: haqaza hawala dubbat al-mukhabarat ib‘adi ‘an al-hariri. Musalsal harb al-ilgha did al-
hariri. 1998-2011’, Al-Mustaqbal (Beirut), 27 July 2011. 
5 Bernard Rougier, L’Oumma en fragments. Contrôler le Sunnisme au Liban, (Paris, PUF, 2011); 
Nasser Kalawoun, “Tripoli in Lebanon: An Islamist fortress or a source of terror?,” in George Joffé 
(ed.), Islamist Radicalisation in Europe and the Middle East, London: I. B. Tauris, 2013; Abdel-
Ghani Imad, The Islamist movements in Tripoli, Beirut: Dar al-Saqi, 1998; Abdel Ghani Imad “A 
Topography of Sunni Islamic Organizations and Movements in Lebanon,” Contemporary Arab 
Affairs, 2 (1), 2009, pp. 143–161.  
Mohamed Abi Samra, Tripoli. The Allah square and the port of modernity (in Arabic), Beirut: Dar 
al-Nahar, 2011. 
6 Bruno Dewailly, “Transformation du leadership tripolitain: le case de Nagib Mikati”, in Franck 
Mermier and Sabrina Mervin (eds.), Leaders et partisans, Paris: Karthala/IFPO, 2012, pp. 165-185; 
7 See, for instance, Nusri Sayigh, Abd al-Hamid Karmai, Rajul al-Qadaya (Abdel-Hamid Karami. 
The man and the cause), Beirut: Sharikat al-Matbu‘at li’l-tawzi‘ wa’l- Nasr, 2011. For studies 
published by the actors themselves (mainly al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya), see Amal ‘Itani, ‘Abd al-Qadir 
‘Ali and Mu‘in al-Manna‘, Al-Jam‘a al- Islamiyya fi lubnan munthu alnash’a hatta 1975 (al-
Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon from the creation until 1975), Beirut: Zeituna (edited by Mohsen 
Mohd Saleh), 2009; Fathy Yakan, Qatuf Sha’ik fi haql al-tajarib al-islamiyya. Ru’a islamiyya min 
‘am 2000 (Difficult harvests in the arena of Islamic experiences. An Islamic vision from the Year 
2000), Beirut: al-Risalah, 2001; Majid Darwiche, “Ghayat al-sukkan wa’izhar al-manan fi tarjamat 
al-da‘aiyya Fathy Yakan (1933-2009) (“The goals of the population and the appearance of blessings 
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complemented with other issue-specific material, on the modes of intervention in 
the Tripoli’s parliamentary elections,8 Tripoli’s municipality,9 social conditions,10 
rural dynamics in Akkar,11 and the compliance with Human Rights.12  
 The written material is complemented with fieldwork research carried out 
during a six-year period in North Lebanon (2008-2013). The author met with 
politicians, religious shaykhs, grassroots activists, university professors, and 
journalists, from all sides of the political spectrum.13 Because confidence was built 
up with the informants over time, revealing, hitherto unknown, anecdotes and more 
precise information were obtained. Triangulating the different sources, the present 
study attempts to describe, in the most empirical and nuanced manner possible, 
Syrian practices in North Lebanon, and to put it into context with the general 
political practices during Pax Syriana.  
                                                                                                                                  
in the life-story of the preacher Fathy Yakan)”, in Al-da‘aiyya Fathy Yakan, al-mu’tamar al-duwali 
alawal, Tripoli: Jinan University, 13 June 2010, pp. 372-389. 
8 Safuh Munajjid, al-intikhabat al-niyabiyya fi trablus wa’l-shamal khilal miat ‘am. 1909-2009 
(Parliamentary elections in Tripoli over hundred years. 1909-2009), Tripoli: Dar al-Bilad, 2009. 
9 Bruno Dewailly, “La municipalité de Tripoli entre pouvoirs locaux et services de l'Etat”, in Agnès 
Favier (ed.), Municipalités et pouvoirs locaux au Liban, Beirut: Cahiers du CERMOC, 24, 2001, p. 
295-318. 
10 Catherine Le Thomas, Pauvreté et conditions socio-économiques à Al-Fayhâ’a: diagnostic et 
éléments de stratégie, report published by l’Institut Européen de Coopération et de Développement 
(IECD) and l’Agence française de développement, December 2009. 
11 Joseph Ibrahim Abdallah, al-sir‘a al-ijtima‘i fi ‘akkar wa’ thuhur ‘ailat al-b‘arini (The social 
conflict in Akkar and the rise of the B‘arini family), Beirut: Mokhtarat, 1993. 
12 Virginia N. Sherry, Syria's Tadmor prison: dissent still hostage to a legacy of terror, 8(2), 
Washington: Human Rights Watch report, 1996, 26; Syria. The price of dissent, Washington: 
Human Rights Watch Report, 7(4), July 1995; Amnesty International, ‘Arbitrary arrests, 
‘disappearances’, and extrajudicial executions by Syrian troops and Syrian-backed forces in Tripoli, 
February 29 1987, MDE 24/02/87. 
13 180 semi-structured interviews were conducted between March 2008 and October 2013 with 140 
actors. 
Syria Studies    
 
24 
 
 
The Syrian presence in North Lebanon 
Syrian troops, which at most numbered 40,000, first entered Lebanon on June 1st 
1976 during the first round of the Lebanese civil war to crush the momentum of the 
Palestinian-Islamo-Progressive alliance.14 It was mandated as an Arab Defence 
Force (ADF) in October 1976.15 The non-Syrian elements of the ADF were 
withdrawn during the spring of 1979, while Syrian forces remained in Lebanon 
until April 2005. 
 After initially intervening at the request of the Christian conservatives, Syria 
reknitted ties with the PLO, the Lebanese left, Iraq, and Jordan after Sadat’s travel 
to Jerusalem in November 1977. The marriage of convenience between Syria and 
the PLO ended after Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, and turned into outright 
war in Tripoli in the autumn of 1983. Syria’s strategy in Lebanon was nonetheless 
consistent in the sense that it at all times aimed to impede either of the conflicting 
parties in the Lebanese war from conclusively defeating the other.16  
 
Motives for the Syrian presence in the existing literature  
Much has been written about the possible Syrian motives for its paradoxical 
intervention in Lebanon, to contain the PLO and National Movement. Five motives 
identified in the literature are detailed below: 
• Geopolitics: Lebanon is a buffer protecting Damascus and Syrian industrial 
centres against any potential Israeli offensive through the Beqa‘a. 17  The 
intervention into Lebanon occurred in a context when a victory of the National 
Movement was impending and Syrian decision makers feared that the Lebanese 
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state could disintegrate. 18  This caused Syrian alarm because a defeat of the 
Lebanese Christian-conservatives could lead to an Israeli intervention into Lebanon 
and/or a break-up of the country into confessional enclaves, and a defeated 
Christian community might have an incentive to strike an alliance with Israel. After 
the Egyptian-Israeli bilateral peace, Lebanon became a card against which to swap 
the Golan Heights. Damascus wanted to ensure Washington and Israel that there 
could be no durable peace without Syria.19  
• Patronising the Palestinians. After 1973, Syria understood it was bound to lose 
another conventional war with Israel and wanted at any price to avoid being 
dragged into armed confrontation. Moreover, the Asad regime perceived the PLO’s 
growing recognition and autonomy as a great threat. In 1974, the PLO gained 
observer status in the UN General Assembly and, during a summit of Arab state 
leaders in Rabat, it was declared the “sole representative of the Palestinian 
people”.20 For Asad, who insisted his country was the cradle of Pan-Arabism, 
control over the Palestinian cause was an invaluable source of internal and regional 
legitimacy. It was an essential card to use against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and 
internal political enemies.21  
• Ideology: Since the Islamic conquest of Damascus in 636, Syria was thecentre 
of Bilad al-Sham (Greater Syria), which included Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and 
parts of Turkey. The redrawing of international borders by the British and French 
in 1920 and the loss of Lebanon were great traumas for Syrian Arab nationalists. 
Lebanon and Syria were perceived as constituting one indivisible nation.22 Dawisha 
argues that this belief was fundamental in shaping Syrian policies towards 
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Lebanon.23 It helped legitimise the intervention in some segments of the domestic 
public opinion and amongst Syrian policy makers. Pan-Syrianism does, however, 
not suffice to account for the timing of the intervention in 1976.24 Pan-Syrianism 
was not the only reason why Syria intervened in Lebanon, but a complementary 
explanatory variable. When, in spring 1976, the Asad regime finally decided to 
intervene in Lebanon, it was for the pursuit of more tangible strategic gains, 
essential for regime survival. 
•    Regime survival: Lebanon was central to the debate on Syrian internal stability 
because of its role, since 1949, as a centre of conspiracy and subversion, from 
which coups d’État occurring in Damascus were planned.25 Since 1970, a growing 
part of Syrian society had protested against the usurpation of power by a military 
clique hailing from rural, minority backgrounds. In February 1973, protests erupted 
against the new constitution, which omitted the article of former Syrian 
constitutions requiring that the president had to be a (Sunni) Muslim. 26  
• Political economy: Despite economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, Syria 
suffered from a widening balance of payment gap already in 1976.27 The outbreak 
of the Lebanese civil war had hampered the accessibility of capital, on which 
Syrian heavy industries depended.28 Some scholars therefore argue that Syria 
intervened in Lebanon in order to extract the needed resources, from the Lebanese 
banking system, the port of Beirut and cheap Lebanese manufactures, to prevent 
the escalation of a social conflict at home.29 It is pertinent to point to the economic 
gains actors in the Syrian regime made in Lebanon (see below), but there is not a 
solid enough empirical data to demonstrate that domestic protests in Syria took off 
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24 Fred Lawson, ‘Syria’s intervention in the Lebanese civil war, 1976: a domestic conflict 
explanation’, International Organization, 38, 1984, p. 457. 
25 Ba‘ath leaders, including Michel Aflaq and Salah Bitar, as well as Syrian Muslim Brotherhood 
leader, Mustafa Siba‘i, fled to Lebanon in 1953. 
26 The Alawi community, to which the Syrian president and a very high proportion of his lieutenants 
belonged, was seen as non-Muslim by many Sunnis. Olivier Carré and Michel Seurat (Gérard 
Michaud), Les frères musulmans (1928-1982), Paris: Gallimard, 1983, pp. 132-134.   
27 Volker Perthes, A political economy of Syria under Asad, London: I.B. Tauris, 1995, p. 29.  
28 Lawson, « The Syrian intervention » p. 469. 
29 Lawson, « The Syrian intervention » pp. 473-475. 
Syria Studies    
 
27 
 
prior to the intervention into Lebanon.30 The tipping point for the unrest seems to 
have been immediately following the intervention, when tens of thousands of 
Syrians took to the streets against the crushing of the Lebanese National Movement 
and the PLO in Lebanon.31 This led to the arrest of several hundred people in Syria, 
mainly communists.32 The presence in Lebanon was moreover a financial burden 
on Syria in the early phase.33  
 The intervention of Syrian troops into Lebanon is therefore best explained 
using a realist paradigm: a consolidated and unitary state seeking to protect its 
security in the face of external aggression. This did not exclude the fact that Syria 
also benefited from the intervention into Lebanon to quell domestic political 
enemies, in particular in Tripoli. However, over time, once Syria consolidated its 
influence in Lebanon, economic interests and concerns related to Syria’s domestic 
politics became more important. This was especially so after 1983, when Syria’s 
economy began to suffer from a serious decline and budget deficits.34  
 Although a set of defined long-term foreign policy objectives existed, the 
Syrian regime operated without a general plan and grasped opportunities as they 
arose.35 The departure of the PLO from Lebanon (1983) extended Syria’s margins 
of manoeuvre. The deepening of the alliance with Iran by the mid-1980s and 
Syria’s isolation from the Arab world during the Iran-Iraq war also helped modify 
the stakes within Lebanon.  
 The Syrian continuing role in Lebanon after the end of the civil war was 
enshrined by the Ta’if accords (October 1989), which formally ended the war in 
Lebanon.36 The accords provided that the Syrian forces would assist the Lebanese 
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government in restoring sovereignty throughout the country. Two years after the 
ratification of the accord, they were to redeploy to the Beqa‘a. Further 
redeployments would be decided later by a Lebanese and Syrian military 
committee. Bilateral treaties, such as the May 1991, Brotherhood, Cooperation and 
Coordination Treaty, gave further legal grounds for the Syrian presence. This 
“Syrian peace” was accepted by the Bush administration, partly because it was 
considered better than the alternative of anarchy from the Lebanese civil war, 
partly because Hafiz al-Asad’s regime was already in 1989 seen as a potential 
source of support against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.  
 
The roots of the conflict between Tripoli’s Sunnis and the Asad regime 
Muslim elites in Lebanon and Syria respectively had, ever since the 1930s, 
somewhat uneasy relations.37  These emerged out of conflicting interests, not 
religion. Since Lebanon lacked Arab nationalist credentials and Syria saw itself as 
the cradle of Pan-Arabism, Syrian notables felt entitled to give ideological 
guidance to the Arab nationalist movement in Lebanon. 38  Lebanese Arab 
nationalists resented this intervention in their affairs. They also denounced Syrian 
Arab nationalist governments’ use of food blockage vis-à-vis Lebanon as an 
instrument to solve economic differences.39 They saw Gamal Abdel-Nasser, not the 
Syrian Ba‘ath party, as being entitled to lead the Arab Umma. When, at the break-
up of the United Arab Republic in 1961, many of Tripoli’s Muslims sided with 
Abdel-Nasser, 40 Syrian notables were annoyed.41 In the 1970s, urban poor Sunnis 
in Tripoli gave strong support to all of the Asad regime’s regional enemies: Fatah, 
the Iraqi Ba‘ath party and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. This support may be 
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interpreted in light of the increasingly conflictual relationship between Sunnis in 
North Lebanon and Syria. 
 Until the late 1960s, Alawis in Tripoli had formed part of the same social space 
and political masses as the Sunni Muslims. The politicisation of Alawi identity in 
North Lebanon began in the 1970s. While Sunni Muslims and many Christians in 
Tripoli in the late 1960s adhered to New Left parties and movements close to 
Yasser Arafat, Alawis in Tripoli increasingly began to see Hafiz al-Asad as a 
model. 
 
Salah Jadid’s regime and the peasant movement in Akkar 
Syria began to increasingly meddle in domestic policies in North Lebanon after 
Salah Jadid’s takeover in 1966. The main Syrian entryway was in this early period 
through the peasant movements in Akkar. The protesters could be identified not 
only in terms of their class but also by their sect: the great majority of the 
protesting agricultural labourers in the plains of Akkar were Alawis, while the 
landlords were Sunnis.  
 The first Alawi families in Lebanon emigrated in search for work from the 
impoverished Jabal Ansariyah in Syria starting from the end of the 19th century. 42 
The emigration was accentuated during the years of economic boom (1950 et 1960) 
and, more intensely, during the period of the Syrian tutelage. Many were seasonal 
labourers, who travelled back and forth from Syria.  
 The two main protest leaders included Khaled Saghieh, a Greek-Orthodox 
Ba‘athist lawyer who had studied in Damascus, and Mohamed Ba‘arini, a Sunni 
tribal chieftain. Saghieh was a pragmatist close to the Ba‘ath party.43 He was 
guided by some general beliefs on Arab nationalism and rights of peasants, but did 
not develop a sophisticated ideology. His leadership recalled that of Akram 
Hourani in the Hama region. As a permanent candidate for the legislative elections 
since 1964, Saghieh wooed the Alawi community, which he hoped could adopt him 
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as their representative, given that Alawis had no parliamentary representation in 
Lebanon before Ta’ef. Ba‘arini hailed from Fneideq, a perfect example of what 
Michael Gilsenan called the “Lebanese marches”.44 Here, men worked in the 
Lebanese army or gained a living from smuggling. Having relations with Syria was 
primordial for the population to survive. Ba‘athist Arab nationalism was popular 
amongst the peasants.  
 In March 1973, after an assassination attempt targeting landlord leader Sleiman 
al-Ali’s brother, Malik, Khaled Saghieh and Ba‘arini escaped to Syria. Saghieh 
returned in early 1973. He was shot shortly afterwards and died three months later 
from his wounds.45 Mohamed Ba‘arini stayed in exile in Homs, and was de facto 
pardoned in 1976, after the Syrian entry to Lebanon. The peasant revolts ended 
because of the war. Ba‘arini became one of Syria’s main allies in Lebanon. His son, 
Wajih Ba‘arini, took over his leadership, and accumulated personal wealth through 
smuggling. When candidates were appointed to the legislature to replace deceased 
MPs and fill new seats, Wajih Ba’arini was appointed from Akkar to replace the 
late Sleiman al-Ali.  
 It may be hypothesised that the peasant revolts were instigated by the Syrian 
regime to gain leeway in North Lebanon, and later, continued under Asad, once it 
started to prepare for a larger-scale military entry into Lebanon. The fact that 
regular New Left parties failed in their mobilisation attempts in Akkar strengthens 
this argument. When the Organisation for Communist Action in Lebanon (OACL), 
as well as a few Maoist parties, also tried to mobilise peasants, 46 they received a 
warmer welcome in Sunni villages than in Alawi villages. 47 If Alawi peasants 
identified with Saghieh, it was because he was close to the Syrian line.48  
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 The growing support for the peasant movements was perceived by Sunni 
landlords as a communal mobilisation and made them look towards the state to 
protect them from bands of Alawi peasants armed by Damascus. Sunni peasants 
found support among Palestinians in Nahr al-Bared and Beddawi, and began to 
mobilise in favour of the Palestinian resistance, which, at certain points, would 
have put them in opposition to Syria’s strategy in Lebanon. Similar polarisations 
between Alawis and Sunnis in Tripoli began in Tripoli a few years later. 
 
The rise of Ali Eid and the Alawi Youth Movement 
The Alawis in Tripoli numbered approximately 20,000.49 They were poor, and 
most settled in Bab al-Tebbaneh, the most affordable area. Most lived on the upper 
side, called Jabal Drawish or Jabal Mohsen. Like other residents in Bab al-
Tebbaneh, Alawis worked at the vegetable market, the wheat souq, the factories in 
Bahsas or at the port in al-Mina.50  
 Alawis and Sunnis in Bab al-Tebbaneh belonged to the same social strata and 
until the early 1970s, were part of the same political realm as the Sunnis in Tripoli. 
Alawis were often business associates with Sunnis, and intermarriages were 
relatively common.51 Class was initially the driving force behind political action in 
Tebbaneh.52 However, when it came to obtaining official positions within the state, 
Alawis had to convert to Sunnism to have the chance to hold an official function. 
In the late 1960s, with the consolidation of the Alawi in power in Damascus, 
Lebanese Alawis began to look to Syria for political support.53 Some adhered to 
pro-Syrian political groups, such as the Lebanese branch of the Syrian Ba‘ath 
Party.  
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 In 1972, a group of Alawi young professionals created a movement 
campaigning for political rights for Lebanese Alawis, the Alawi Youth Movement 
(harakat al-shabiba al-alawiyya). 54  Its two main claims were Alawi representation 
in parliament (at least one seat) and naturalisation of 20,000 Alawi workers who 
had migrated from Syria.55 Ali Eid, an Alawi from Jabal Mohsen, soon became 
President of the society. Eid’s grandfather had emigrated from Syria and opened a 
large shop in Tripoli’s wheat souq. Eid travelled to the US to study, married an 
American woman and had a daughter, but was expelled the same year because he 
committed a crime.56 He returned to Lebanon and studied political science at the 
AUB. He claimed to have been inspired by US civil rights movements, and 
considered the Alawis in Lebanon to be in a position similar to the blacks in the 
US.57  
 In 1972, Ali Eid was stabbed with a knife in the back by a Saudi prince, during 
a night out, and hospitalised.58 Eid was close to President Sleiman Frangié, who 
arranged for Prime Minister Sa’ib Salam to strike a deal between Eid and the Saudi 
prince according to which the prince paid a large sum of money to Ali Eid to get 
his agreement to withdraw charges.59 Eid consolidated his ties with the Salam and 
Frangié families and became close to Frangié’s son, Tony. The latter supplied Eid 
with weapons, which originated from Syria.60 Salam and Frangié sought to split 
Tripoli’s political scene and weaken Rashid Karami, their political enemy.61 
Frangié also introduced Aid to the Asads. It cannot be ruled out that the patronage 
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of the Frangié family for Eid, constituted an exchange of service, after Frangié had 
received help of various types from Syria in the late 1950s onwards.62 
 With the financial power of Ali Eid, the Alawi Youth Movement soon became 
a tool for the Eid family to control the Alawi community in Tripoli. Eid put his own 
family in all its positions.63 Moreover, Sa’ib Salam, Prime Minister and Interior 
Minister, who had given it official authorisation, came to Tripoli and celebrated the 
official launch of the society. 
 
Musa al-Sadr, the Asad regime, and Tripoli 
From initially being close to Frangié, Ali Eid soon developed contacts with the 
Syrian regime. This occurred after Eid organised large protests against Shi‘i cleric 
Musa Sadr, the Chairman of Lebanon's Supreme Islamic Shiite Council (SISC). 
Eid’s opposed Sadr’s ambition to put the personal status codes of the Lebanese 
Alawi community under the jurisdiction of the SISC. In 1973, Sadr issued a fatwa 
that Alawism was a part of Shi‘i Islam. Although Lebanese Alawis were de jure 
under the jurisdiction of the Sunni-dominated Supreme Islamic Shari‘a Council, the 
sect had de facto obtained autonomy in internal affairs under the French. Since they 
were part of the same tribes as the Syrian Alawis, they referred to Alawi religious 
shaykhs in Syria on important communal matters.  
 Alawi traditional tribal and religious shaykhs in Syria proper were initially 
reluctant to give Sadr jurisdiction over Lebanon’s Alawis,64 but priorities changed 
in early 1973, after Sunni protests swept through Syrian cities against Hafiz al-
Asad’s assumption of the presidency, the first non-Sunni to hold the post. The 
Syrian President needed an external authority, preferably a Twelver Shi‘i cleric, to 
boost his regime’s Islamic credentials. During a public ceremony in July 1973 in 
Tripoli, al-Sadr, in his official function as chairman of the SISC, appointed a 
Lebanese Alawi to the position of Twelver Mufti of Tripoli and Northern Lebanon. 
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A delegation of Syrian Alawi religious shaykhs endorsed the move with their 
presence.  
 The Alawi Youth Movement opposed al-Sadr, arguing that Alawis should gain 
separate legal recognition, independent of the Twelver Shi‘is. The society 
mobilised in the days before al-Sadr’s arrival in Tripoli. Tensions in the streets of 
Tripoli ran high, and roadblocks were set up.65 Rifa‘at al-Asad visited Tripoli to 
mediate and convinced Eid that Syrian patronage would protect the Alawis in 
Lebanon. 66 Al-Sadr was obliged to issue a “clarification” in which he declared that 
SISC’s aim had been not to absorb the Alawis into the Ja‘afari sect but to provide 
them with “a service they lacked”, that is, communal tribunals.67  
 Rifa‘at al-Asad had been recommended to Eid by Tony Frangié, son of 
President Sleiman Frangié and a close personal friend of Rifa‘at’s. Eid soon gained 
strong support from Rifa‘at and Jamil al-Asad, who were developing the Ali 
Murtada organisation in Syria against the Muslim Brotherhood.68 Rifa‘at sent one 
of his three sons, Ribal, to Tripoli to help his ally.69 Eid gained access to important 
funds, which enabled him to expand his clientele in Jabal Mohsen. By 1976, Eid 
had become the symbol of the Syrian regime in Tripoli. He married a Syrian Alawi 
from Safita, and travelled regularly to Tartus.70 When he had a son in 1977, he 
named him, coincidentally or not, Rifa‘at. When Syria turned against the 
Palestinians in the spring of 1976, Eid remained a Syrian protégée. The Syrian 
intervention led to a worsening of the Alawi-Sunni conflict. While all other 
political parties were banned, Eid was given large concessions and developed his 
presence in Tripoli. 
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Strains in the Palestino-Syrian relations: North Lebanon as an example 
During an offensive in April 1976, prior to the June Syrian intervention, the 
Palestinian-Progressive coalition 71 forces in Tripoli struck Jabal Mohsen and 
destroyed several houses, including Eid’s.72 This forced many of Tripoli’s Alawis 
to leave Jabal Mohsen and abandon their houses, and many went to Syria. 73 The 
strike targeted Eid because he allied with Syria, and also occurred in a context of 
strikes against Syrian allies, Sa‘iqa and PFLP-GC,74 but was framed by Eid as an 
attack against the Alawis as a community.  
 Eid used the event as a casus belli and began to argue that the Alawis needed to 
protect themselves militarily. Alawis became increasingly fearful for their  
existence in Tripoli, and many began to leave other areas in Tripoli to settle in 
Jabal Mohsen, which became a sectarian sanctuary.75 The attack also worsened 
relations between Sunnis in Bab al-Tebbaneh and Alawis in Jabal Mohsen, since 
men from Tebbaneh supported Fatah in the attack.76  
 
The impact of the Syrian intervention on Sunni militancy in Tripoli 
Rashid Karami and other Sunni institutional leaders welcomed the entry in June 
1976 of the Syrian army to Lebanon to re-stabilise Lebanon. Karami developed 
close bonds to Syria. The same was true for many of Tripoli’s merchants and 
notables, who developed friendships and close economic and political bonds to 
officers of the Syrian army. Tripoli’s left-wing parties, on the other hand, opposed 
the entry of the Syrian army into Lebanon as a bid to crush PLO. The Syrian army 
outlawed all political parties, with the exception of the SSNP. All the left-wing 
parties, including the 24 October movement, the strongest local militia, decided to 
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withdraw without a battle. 77 The PLO left Tripoli and settled its forces in the 
nearby Palestinian camps, Beddawi and Nahr al-Bared. Other activists stopped 
their activities and went underground. 
 The Iraqi Ba‘ath party became one of the heaviest Syrian targets in 1978. 
Ghassan Salamé wrote in 1991 that Syria in its regional policy was driven more by 
the rivalry with Iraq than by Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause.78 The 
Tripoli case shows that, although the overall cause for the Syrian intervention into 
Lebanon was to avoid breakdown of the Lebanese state and thus a direct 
confrontation with Israel, Syria’s entry into Lebanon assisted it in crushing its own 
geopolitical enemies. An illustration of the Asad regime’s sectarian policies in 
Tripoli was that unlike Abd al-Majid al-Rafa‘i, the Sunni head of the Lebanese 
branch of the Iraqi Ba’th, whose house was destroyed and who was forced into 
exile,79 Dr. Khodr, an Alawi cadre of the Iraqi Ba‘ath party in Tripoli, was not 
arrested or targeted, but co-opted and moved to Jabal Mohsen 80  
 Jund Allah, the largest Islamist militia in Tripoli at the time, took pains to 
appease Syria. The group stopped all activity between the entry of Syrian troops in 
1976 and until 1978.81 In 1978, Jund Allah leader Fawaz Agha was arrested by the 
Syrian intelligence and held for 40 days. When released, he was forced to give up 
his weapons and cease his political activities. This event coincided with the Israeli 
occupation of South Lebanon, and Jund Allah was allowed to send combatants to 
defend the south. 82 This helped Jund Allah gain new legitimacy, access to centres 
of military training in the south, and contacts with Fatah, which began to send 
weapons and money.83 By 1979 Jund Allah had become a well-developed group, 
with military activities in South Lebanon, religious training, a dispensary and a 
sports club. Although the PLO formally realigned with Syria in 1979, Jund Allah 
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began to oppose Syria. 84 The opposition became more and more pronounced, and 
in 1981, Jund Allah had gained enough strength to expel the Syrians from their 
positions in Abi Samra. 
 
The Creation of the Arab Democratic Party 
The entry of the Syrian-dominated ADF facilitated the penetration of a strong 
contingent of Syrian intelligence agents in Lebanon. In Tripoli, it took the 
Communist Action Organizatin’s former office at the American School in Jabal 
Mohsen as its headquarters. From the Syrian side, protecting the Alawis was 
subordinate to the fact that85 Jabal Mohsen was a strategic place on a hill and at a 
distance from the Lebanese army HQ in Qubbeh. Moreover, because Alawis had 
left their houses subsequent to the attack on Jabal Mohsen, there were many vacant 
houses. Syrian forces moved in to control these areas. The choice of Jabal Mohsen 
was perceived by many Tripolitanians as a sign that the Syrian regime was 
pursuing a sectarian policy in Lebanon.86 Eid returned to Tripoli with the Syrian 
forces, and rebuilt his house where it had been, as a challenge to his political 
enemies.87 The Arab Youth Movement in Jabal Mohsen developed into a militia, 
the Red Knights, under Syrian control.  
 In June 1981, Eid and certain other Syrian allies created the Arab Democratic 
Party (ADP).88 The party had no obvious Alawi appearance. Nassib al-Khatib, the 
Sunni lawyer from South Lebanon, was elected President, and Rashed al-
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Muqaddem, a Sunni from Tripoli, became Secretary-General.89 Yet, de facto power 
within the ADP lay with Eid and his patron, Rifa‘at al-Asad. ADP’s Alawi 
character became more avowed in 1985, when al-Khatib was replaced with Eid. 
Al-Khatib was assassinated the following year. 
 
Proxy battle between Tebbaneh and Jabal Mohsen (1979-1982) 
Bab al-Tebbaneh was one of the few areas in Tripoli where the Syrian army was 
not immediately heavily deployed. The strength of the Popular Resistance, a local 
social and military group, led by a young local charismatic leader, Khalil Akkawi, 
hindered the Syrian troops’ entry there.90 Yet, growing pressure from Syrian 
intelligence centred in Jabal Mohsen forced the group to demobilise.91 A wave of 
arrests began, and some activists were found assassinated. Akkawi went into hiding 
in Beddawi under the PLO’s protection.92  Those, who remained in Bab al-
Tebbaneh stopped their activities, for fear of arrest and assassination.  
 Despite the end of open fighting, relations between pro-Syrian and Fatah-
affiliated Palestinian groups remained tense. Kidnappings and assassinations 
targeted prominent communist, Iraqi Ba‘athist and Popular Resistance leaders.93 
The civilian population suffered from siege and electricity- and water cuts. 
Barricades were set up in the poor quarters. People in Tebbaneh were threatened by 
snipers located in Jabal Mohsen, and many were arrested or attacked by the Syrian 
forces. The situation led to a growing anti-Syrian climate. The leader of the new 
anti-Syrian mobilisation was Sa‘id Sh‘aban, an Islamic religious preacher and 
former member of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya (JI), the Lebanese branch of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. He became increasingly popular because of his violent denunciations 
of the Syrian presence. Resentment was directed against Eid. With the help of the 
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Syrian intelligence, Eid took control of state infrastructure in Tripoli and important 
sources of material wealth. Arafat-sympathisers in Bab al-Tebbaneh increasingly 
began to see him as a puppet of the Syrian intelligence machine. The rise of Jabal 
Mohsen as an Alawi communal ghetto worried people in Tripoli, who also felt that 
the Syrian army was partisan in local conflicts and that its presence tilted the 
internal balances of power in Tripoli.94 
 The first instance of heavy fighting between Arafat-supporters in Bab al-
Tebbaneh and Alawis in Jabal Mohsen broke out in the spring of 1979, following 
the withdrawal of the last non-Syrian contingents from the ADF. Many Sunni 
movements, including Jund Allah supported the Popular Resistance. Syria was 
involved in the confrontation yet officially insisted that it was doing nothing other 
than carrying out its mandate from the Arab countries, i.e., to separate between 
fighting forces, repress militias, and end the civil war”.95   
 The Popular Resistance fought against what it perceived to be a Syrian 
occupation, and defended what it saw as the integrity, honour and collective 
memory of Tripoli as a “combative city state”.96 The fighting between Eid’s group 
and the Popular Resistance initially occurred in spite of, and not because of, 
alliances at the regional level. 97  Despite the rapprochement which occurred 
between Fatah and Syria against Egypt in late 1977 (see above), Hafiz al-Asad and 
Fatah chairman Yasser Arafat were never allies. They competed for the control 
over the Palestinian cause. Arafat pursued a double strategy vis-à-vis Syria. He 
granted concessions to Asad but maintained relations with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
and Sadat’s Egypt.98 Syria accused Arafat of hindering a common Arab front 
against Egypt, and being fooled by the US administration and gave full backing to 
Arafat’s rivals within the PLO. With the late 1970s outbreak of the Muslim 
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Brotherhood insurgency in Syria, Asad also accused Arafat of sheltering fugitive 
Brotherhood fighters in the Palestinian camps in North Lebanon.99  
 Tripoli became a microcosm of the Syrian-Palestinian rivalry. The city was a 
confined social space, where damaging ripple effects of local battles could be 
managed relatively easily. Thus, Asad and Arafat were partners at the regional and 
national Lebanese level, but in Tripoli Fatah backed the Popular Resistance 
movement, while the Syrian regime continued to prop up Ali Eid. 100  Fighting 
between Jabal Mohsen and Bab al-Tebbaneh escalated in July 1981, and 
intermittent heavy clashes and car bombs caused over a hundred casualties during 
the year preceding the Israeli 1982 invasion. 
 As the Syrian regime and Arafat both invested politically in Tripoli, Bab al-
Tebbaneh’s struggle increasingly became part of the broader regional conflict.101 
The conflict was at the time not sectarian. One of the Popular Resistance field 
commanders, Samir al-Hassan, was Alawi and fought alongside Akkawi against 
Eid. 102 The front line of Syria Street, which divided the two quarters, was used by 
external actors as a means to send messages, and the dynamics were understood as 
such. 103  
 
Syrian motivations in North Lebanon 
In this section, three hypotheses on the Asad regime’s motivations in North 
Lebanon will be tested. First, it will be argued that Syria considered North Lebanon 
a high risk-area because of the rise of Islamist movements in Tripoli after 1982. 
Second, it will be asked whether the Asad regime had a specific antipathy towards 
Sunni Muslims, which made it seek alliances to counter the influence of Sunni 
leaders. Thirdly, it will be argued that North Lebanon became a centre of a Syrian-
dominated informal economy.  
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The Syrian opposition to the Tawhid movement 
In September 1982, in the wake of the Israeli invasion and the PLO evacuation 
from Beirut a new Islamist militia, the Islamic Tawhid movement (Harakat al-
Tawhid al-Islami), emerged in Tripoli. The movement was created by the 
unification of three movements: the Popular Resistance, Esmat Mrad’s Arab 
Lebanon movement, and shaykh Sa‘id Sh‘aban and his supporters. The Popular 
Resistance and the Arab Lebanon Movement were Maoist movements close to 
Fatah, in particular to Fatah’s Student Squad. Both Akkawi and Mrad had recently 
turned towards Islam, as a means to become closer to the ideology of the people 
they sought to mobilise.104 Because they lacked Islamic credentials, they turned 
towards Shaykh Sa‘id Sh‘aban and asked him to become their public face. Jund 
Allah joined Tawhid three months later, and gave additional Islamic legitimacy to 
the movement. 
 Tawhid is often described as a movement supported by Iran, but recent 
empirical research indicates that Iran supported shaykh Sa‘id Sh‘aban more than 
Tawhid as such.105 Other leaders within Tawhid, Mrad and Akkawi in particular, 
were closer to Fatah than to Iran (although Akkawi travelled three times to Iran 
before he was killed).106 Tawhid fought on Fatah’s side in the Syrian-Palestinian 
war in Autumn 1983. When Fatah evacuated, it left its weapons with Tawhid and 
this facilitated a further Tawhid takeover of Tripoli. Tawhid waged battles against 
the Iraqi Ba‘ath party and killed several dozen members of the communist party. It 
declared the creation of an Islamic emirate, imposed its own preachers to teach 
religion in public and private schools and created a morality police. The Syrian 
army besieged Tripoli but let Tawhid retain power. In September 1985, the 
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communist party, the SSNP and other secularist parties, bolstered by Syrian 
support, gave an ultimatum to Tawhid, where they demanded to be allowed to 
return to Tripoli. A 21-day battle ended with an armistice signed in Damascus, the 
Damascus II agreement. Although Syria was a party to the conflict, Abdel-Halim 
Khaddam publically fronted himself as a mediator.  
 According to the Damascus II Agreement, Tawhid gave up their weapons and 
control of the city to the internal security forces (i.e. Syrian intelligence) in return 
for impunity. The agreement was not respected by Syria. Large waves of arrest of 
Tawhid members ensued. The first Tawhid leader to be assassinated was Khalil 
Akkawi, killed at a Syrian roadblock in February 1986. Others killed in the same 
period included Abd al-Karim al-Biddawi, a cadre and shayhk of Jund Allah107 and 
Abu Rabi‘a al-Kurdiyyeh, an al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya [JI] member who had played a 
prominent role in the battle against the Syrian army in 1985. Many of those killed 
were of the Maoist-Islamist line, and had been part of Fatah’s Student Brigade.108 
The killings and assassinations led to the flight of most Tawhid first- and second- 
rank leaders from Tripoli.  
 In December 1986, former Tawhid members attempted an “Intifada” in Tripoli, 
and attacked and killed 15 Syrian soldiers at a checkpoint in Bab al-Tebbaneh.109 
This led to a strong Syrian reaction. On 21 and 22 December 1986, Syrian troops 
sealed off Tebbaneh, while Ali Eid’s Alawi Red Knight militia and Tareq Fakhr al-
Din’s Tripoli resistance went into the district and committed the killings.110 At least 
200 people were killed, though the actual number of deaths was never established.  
 Although Syria affirmed that those who died were “those who had put up 
resistance during armed clashes”,111 eyewitness reported that most of those killed 
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were civilians, political supporters and/or family members of Khalil Akkawi’s. 
They were executed in front of their homes during the night, often in their pyjamas. 
Machine-guns, rocket-propelled grenades and tanks were used in the house-to-
house search operations throughout the district. One of the first persons killed was 
the father of Riyadh al-Rifa‘i, a religious shaykh. The Syrian army went to his 
house and asked his wife who to kill, the father or the son.112 Most families in 
Tebbaneh had someone of their households who died or disappeared during the 
massacre. In total, several hundred people were reported “missing”. An unknown 
number of people are still kept in Syrian jails. Although members of Tareq Fakhr 
al-Din’s Tripoli resistance were working class Sunni Muslims who had joined for 
money, the massacre went down in the collective memory of Sunni Tripolitanians 
as one committed by the Alawi leader Ali Eid and the Syrian regime against the 
Sunnis. Unlike the Sabra and Shatila massacre, in which the killings had little 
potential political and military gains – since the PLO commandos had already left 
Lebanon, the massacre in Tebbaneh was part of a broader strategy of political 
domination. 113 During and following the massacre the Syrian army took control of 
Tebbaneh. Another aim was to create enmity between Sunnis in Tebbaneh and 
Alawis in Jabal Mohsen. Since Eid’s Red Knights militia had played an important 
role in the massacre, Alawis began to feel more vulnerable and more dependent on 
Syria for their survival.  
 
The impact of the Syrian civil war (1976-1982) on Tripoli  
Tripoli was also affected by the armed confrontation within Syria pitting the Asad 
regime against Sunni Muslim opposition members from Homs, Hama, and Aleppo. 
This also explained the Syrian attempts to control Tripoli. After a massacre in April 
1981 in Aleppo, clashes between Sunnis and Alawis within the Syrian army 
stationed in Lebanon were reported. 114  Publications by the Syrian Muslim 
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Brotherhood (MB), which described Alawis as inheritors of a long history of plots 
and subversion against Muslims, stretching from the sacking of the Ka‘aba by the 
Qarmates in the 9th century until the loss of the Golan in 1967, were distributed in 
Tripoli.115 Nasheeds (songs) supportive of the struggle of the Syrian MB found 
their way to Tripoli, where they were played by sympathising Islamic activists. The 
Aleppean famous nasheed singer Mohamed Abu Ratib, who was affiliated with the 
Syrian MB and wrote many anti-Asad songs, dedicated one song to “the battle for 
Tripoli” against Syria and the massacre in Bab al-Tebbaneh. This was a way to link 
the two struggles and portray them as one.  
 After the sacking of Hama in 1982, some dozens of Syrian Ikhwan came to 
Tripoli fleeing persecution in Syria.116 Approximately ten were from the Fighting 
Vanguard.117 This occurred because of the close and persistent contact between the 
Lebanese Jamaa Islamiya (JI) and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and more 
generally between the population in North Lebanon and the Syrian hinterland. Yet, 
as Salim Allouche, a former coordinator of JI’s political office in North Lebanon 
pointed out in an interview (February 2009), their number was exaggerated for 
political reasons. It provided the Syrian regime a justification to impose stronger 
political control on Tripoli. Allouche argued that there were no more than 50 such 
fugitives in Tripoli, who all arrived in Lebanon as separate individuals. Azzam 
Ayubi, currently leader of JI’s politbureau, estimated the number to be 200.118 Both 
emphasised that the refugees were second and third rank members. Syrian Ikhwan 
leaders almost exclusively fled to Amman, where the Brotherhood’s leadership 
relocated after it was declared illegal in 1980. Sojourns in Syrian-controlled 
Lebanon were complicated for Syrian members of the opposition. 
 While individual JI members may have supported the quest of the Sunni 
Muslim majority in Syria,119 JI as an organisation was not involved in the conflict. 
                                                
115 Carré and Seurat, Les frères musulmans, pp. 174-176. 
116 Interview, Azzam al-Ayubi, Tripoli, February 2009. 
117 Ibid.. 
118 Ibid.. 
119 For instance, Abdallah Babitti, the local coordinator of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Tripoli during 
the war, stated in 1984: “the overwhelming Muslim majority in Tripoli, is eager to keep its religion 
Syria Studies    
 
45 
 
JI opposed the fight pursued by the Syrian MBs in the 1970s and the beginning of 
the 1980s and did not act as a “Syrian MB auxiliary”.120 JI was organisationally 
tied to the MB network, but had from the outset chosen a more pragmatic political 
strategy than the Syrian and Egyptian Brotherhoods. Shaykhs in Lebanon 
considered that the Syrian MB had a “simplistic and idealistic style”. The fact that 
the Islamist uprising failed in Syria demonstrated that it could never work in 
Lebanon, because of the plural Lebanese society.121 Tawhid’s war against the 
Syrian regime was distinct from the Syrian MB’s confrontation against the same 
regime. The war in Bab al-Tebbaneh against the Syrian army and Ali Eid’s Arab 
Democratic Party were expressions of Yasser Arafat’s war against the Syrian 
regime. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the PLO, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq had a 
common adversary in Syria, and this common interest united them.122  
 
Tripoli’s Salafis and the Syrian regime 
Salafism had first gained a foothold in Tripoli when a generation of students of 
religion from Tripoli travelled to the Islamic University of Medina in the 1980s. 
Once their studies were completed, they returned to their hometown and 
established Shar‘ia Institutes. Salafi ideology was not “imported” to Lebanon 
without modifications, but adapted to the Lebanese social reality. Da‘i al-Shahal 
calls himself the “founder of Salafism”in Lebanon”. 123 He studied in Saudi Arabia 
between 1980 and 1984 and returned to Tripoli and opened the Guidance and Well-
doing Institute (al-hidaya wa’l-ihsan) in 1988.124 Al-Shahal quickly rose to become 
the most prominent Salafi cleric in Tripoli. He directed five Islamic institutes in 
                                                                                                                                  
and Islamic moral. Tripolitanians were therefore ‘supportive of having an Islamic country as a 
neighbour’.” Al-Shir’a, p. 197. 
120 Interview, Fathy Yakan, Tripoli, April 2008. 
121 Interview, Mohamed Khodr, reformist (moderate) Salafis shaykh, Tripoli, February 2009. 
122 Sayigh, Armed Struggle, pp. 485, 487. Lefèvre, Ashes of Hama, p. 131. 
123 While Da‘i al-Islam al-Shahal always uses this title and non-Salafis refer to him as such, the title 
is disputed by al-Shahal’s Salafi rivals in Lebanon. The latter claim that Salafism is a current of 
thought – and not an organised movement. 
124 The institution obtained authorisation from the Lebanese state in 1990. Interview, Da‘i al-Islam 
al-Shahal, Tripoli, April 16, 2008. 
Syria Studies    
 
46 
 
Lebanon and administrated the “Guidance radio”, and large welfare projects in 
Sunni regions in Lebanon.125  
 The centre received funding from many of the large Islamic charities in Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Qatar.126 Most of the Saudi funds were channelled through the 
al-Haramayn institution (mu’assassat al-haramayn), one of the largest Saudi 
charities, which closed down in 2004, after US pressure.127 Although the institution 
was close to the Saudi state ‘Ulama and the monarchy, it was also known to fund 
more politicised Salafists abroad. This reflected Saudi Arabia’s willingness to 
counterbalance Iran’s funding to Shi‘a Islamists. Another important sponsor was 
the Kuwaiti Ahya al-Turath association, which funded al-Shahal for three or four 
years.128  
 The Guidance and Well-Doing Institute educated most Salafi high school 
graduates in Lebanon and employed a large number of the returnees from the 
Islamic University of Medina. The teaching staff included graduates from the 
Islamic University of Medina, such as Ra’ed Hlayhel, Mohamed Khodr, and 
shaykh Ahmad, a Palestinian from Nahr al-Bared. Another teacher, Safwan al-
Zu‘abi, was a businessman who had studied Arabic literature for two years and 
only studied Shar‘ia at the local mosques.129 There were also other teachers with 
future bonds to the global Jihadi movement, including Nabil Rahim, arrested in 
2008, accused of being second-in-command of “al-Qaida and Fatah al-Islam” in 
Lebanon and the coordinator between Jihadists in Lebanon and actors in the global 
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Jihadi network.130 Another teacher, Omar al-Y’ali, was a former member of the 
Tabligh society, who developed close bonds to Lebanese Salafi Jihadis in the 
Diaspora and in Ayn al-Helweh.131 
 In 1996 the Guidance and Well-Doing Institute was closed down by a decision 
of the Lebanese Interior Minister Michel al-Murr, for “inciting confessional hatred” 
(na’arat taifiyya). 132 Four employees of the institute, including al-Shahal’s brother, 
were jailed for two months. 133 The decision was based on the paragraph in a book 
used in the Institute’s curriculum, entitled Contemporary Branches Belonging to 
Islam and the Declarations of Position of Islam towards These. The book was 
written by a Saudi scholar and member of the teaching council (hi’at al-tadris) at 
the Islamic University in Medina.134 A chapter on the Alawis (nusayriyyun),135 
reproduced in one the Guidance and Well-Doing Institute’s textbooks, not only 
described the sect as apostates but indicated that the Syrian regime was in secret 
agreement with the Israeli government on the Golan question.136 The introductory 
paragraph of the chapter on the Alawis read: 
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The Nusayris, as the others of the Esoteric sects are among the enemies of 
the Islamic doctrine […] The closest example of the positions of the 
Nusayris is what happens in Muslim areas in Syria and Lebanon, where 
they killed innocent men, women, and children; another is the alliance of 
the Alawis with Maronites and Khomeinists. The Alawis also encouraged 
tensions in the old days. While the Crusaders slaughtered Muslims […], 
they did not do so with the Alawis, but recognised their holy book. Alawis 
create fitna because they lie in the same trenches as the enemies of Muslims 
against Muslims […]. Between the Alawis and the Jews there is love, and 
they concur on many principles. A certification of this fact came with the 
Six Day War as they call it. What happened during it is one of many 
indications on the positions and enmity of the Alawis towards Ahl al-Sunna 
[…].137 
Moreover, the same chapter directly mentioned the Hama massacre – 
stressing “we shall not forget Hama” and emphasised Ali Eid’s role in 
“plotting” against Sunnis in Lebanon: 
When the Nusayri Ali Eid set himself up as the leader of the Nusayri 
organisation in Tripoli, the owner of the Lebanese al-Hawadith magazine138 
paid attention to this and was killed by a plot of the Alawis. There are also 
many other examples indicating that the Alawis are not convinced of the 
appropriateness of their own sect.139  
  
 The book was used in courses at Saudi universities, including the Umm al-Qura 
University in Mecca in the 1990s and 2000s. This shows the difference between the 
Saudi Arabian and the Lebanese contexts, and, in particular, the red lines in 
Lebanon during the years of Syrian authoritarianism. Al-Shahal’s official narrative 
                                                
137 Awaji, Contemporary Branches, pp. 533-534. My translation. 
138 This paragraph refers to the killing of Salim al-Lawzi, a renowned Arab journalist and the owner 
of the Lebanese pro-Saudi al-Hawadith (“Events”) magazine. Al-Lawzi was born in Tripoli, but 
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mother’s funeral in February 1980, he was abducted by gunmen. Fouad Ajami, The Arab 
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of the closure of the Guidance and Well-Doing Institute was that it was a Syrian 
reaction to his growing strength. The growing popularity of the Salafi Da‘awa had 
“irritated the Syrian regime”, and made it realise that the presence of the Guidance 
and Well-Doing Institute was not in its interest:  
 The Syrian regime wanted the totality of the Islamic movements to be under its 
command and to work solely under its guidance. They want the Islamic movements 
to be an instrument (wasat) of the Syrian regime, as does the Ahbash and others. I 
was an unacceptable opponent (mu‘atarid ghayr shar‘iy). My doctrine, thoughts, 
and policies were against them. […] I did not enter into a conflict with the Syrians 
but doctrinally I am a Salafist and they are Nusayris. They don’t believe in the 
religion. In the depth of their hearts, they have a “party spirit” (ta‘assub) towards 
the Alawi sect and the Shias. 140 
 In 2000, Da‘i al-Shahal’s name was mentioned in the indictment against the 
“Dinniyeh Group”, which fought against the Lebanese army for six days in 
December 1999 and January 2000.141 He fled Lebanon for Saudi Arabia and did 
not return until the men arrested in the Diniyyeh affair were pardoned and released 
in July 2005. Shortly after he had left Lebanon, al-Shahal was sentenced to death in 
absentia. Although the common interpretation is that the Guidance and Well-Doing 
Institute was closed down by the Syrians, because of the above-mentioned book, 
Bernard Rougier – the most established specialist on Salafism in Lebanon – has 
argued that according to the rumours at the time, al-Shahal diffused a tape with a 
sermon of Saudi oppositionist alim, Salman al-Awda on the Guidance and Well-
Doing radio. The Saudi regime therefore asked the Lebanese authorities to close 
the Institute.142 Although direct evidence that the Saudi Embassy was behind the 
closure is hard to find, the idea that Syria, at times, had interests in common with 
the Salafis was confirmed by the author’s own empirical findings, detailed below. 
 When discussing the question of Salafism in Tripoli, it must not be forgotten 
than the rise of Salafism occurred simultaneously with the Syrian presence and that 
                                                
140 Interview, Da‘i al-Islam al-Shahhal, Tripoli, April 2008.  
141 For a study, see Rougier, Everyday Jihad, pp. 229-265. 
142 Bernard Rougier, L’Oumma en fragments, p. 123. For a study of the Sahwa movement, see 
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during Pax Syriana nothing could happen in Tripoli except with Syrian indirect 
endorsement. The presence of Da‘i al-Shahal in Tripoli suited the Asad regime, 
because he called on his followers not to vote and thus helped weaken the clout of 
Rafiq Hariri and other representatives of Lebanese political Sunnism.143 It also 
fragmented the religious scene and the influence of JI.144 Although the JI leadership 
had accepted the Pax Syriana, not all its cadres and members in North Lebanon 
accepted all of Syria’s practices. Khaled Daher, a JI parliamentarian who served 
between 1996 and 2000, was so vocal in his criticism that Syria vetoed his name in 
the 2000 parliamentary elections.145  
 Syria supported the rise of different strands of Salafism by “neglecting it”. 
Many observers of the field of Islamism in Tripoli have pointed out that although 
al-Shahal always represented himself as someone persecuted during the Syrian 
period, his influence over Salafism in Tripoli was stronger in the 1990s than after 
he returned in 2005.146 Al-Shahal, like all other institutional actors at the time, was 
obliged to interact with the Syrian intelligence147  and became “indirectly supported 
by the Syrian security services”.148  Perceptions were often more important in 
politics than reality – and the closure of the institute was framed in the post-2005 
period as a result of Syrian repression. The closure of the institute made is possible 
for Da‘i al-Shahhal to make the Salafis look like victims of the Syrian intelligence 
services. This boosted al-Shahhal’s credibility among anti-Syrian Lebanese Sunnis. 
Moreover, the idea that the Syrian army protected North Lebanon against Sunni 
Salafi Jihadi extremists was an argument that the Syrian regime used frequently in 
the 1990s. It became one of Syria’s main arguments for maintaining a presence in 
Lebanon after Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon in 2000.149 The 
                                                
143 Rougier, l’Oumma en fragments, pp. 72, 122-123. 
144 Interview, Salim Allouche, Tripoli, April 2008. 
145 Interview, Khaled Daher, Tripoli, April 2008, June 2012. 
146 Interview with shaykhs in Tripoli, 2008-2013; Rougier, L’Oumma en fragments, pp. 122-123.  
147 Interview, Salim Allouche, Tripoli, April 2008. 
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presence of Jihadi groups in North Lebanon created an image of Tripoli as a 
“cradle of terrorism”, which justified the Syrian presence, especially vis-à-vis the 
West. 150  The Syrian regime could afford more ambivalence towards Sunni 
Islamists in Lebanon than within its own country.  
 The Salafi networks in Tripoli were autonomous and had their own leadership 
and support networks. It would be reductionist to reduce them to Syrian 
manipulation. Yet, Salafi youth did not always have a clear perception of the 
enemy. In the words of Nir Rosen: “the ideology of Jihad often seemed less 
important than the sheer will to fight – against whoever could be found”.151 Which 
target they finally chose depended on what those who provided them with 
weapons, money, and ammunition told them to do.152 The Syrian intelligence 
agents were aware of this ambivalence and helped orient the activism of zealous 
Salafi youth in Lebanon and Syria towards targets associated with US imperialism, 
and away from targeting the Asad regime and its allies and protégés. This became 
even more evident after the US-led invasion of Iraq and the beginning of the Iraqi 
insurgency, when Damascus gave free passage to Salafi Jihadis who wanted to 
fight the Americans in Iraq. The Asad regime considered Salafis helpful in creating 
an anti-American atmosphere in Lebanon and Syria following the US-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003. 
 The policy continued after the Syrian withdrawal: Syria furnished vital birth-
help to the nucleus of Fatah al-Islam, which fought the Lebanese army in the 
Palestinian camp of Nahr al-Bared in 2007. The group was created by former 
prisoners in Syria with the aim to create tensions within the Sunni community and 
hence weaken the political project of Saad Hariri.153 Syria was therefore an arsonist 
                                                
150 See, for instance, Hussein Ayyub, “What about Hizbullah, the fundamentalists, and the 
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2004. 
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fire-fighter vis-à-vis radical Islamist groups in Lebanon. Thus, while Salafis 
emerged independently of Syrian manipulation, the Asad regime skilfully 
“neglected” Tripoli’s Salafis in order to split the Sunni Islamist field and uphold 
“security vacuums” in Tripoli. Moreover, once the Salafi Jihadis were there, the 
Syrian regime was skilled at orienting Salafi violence against American and 
international targets, rather than against the Asad regime itself. 
 
Did the Syrian regime have an anti-Sunni policy? 
The Syrian tutelage, between 1976 and 2005, coincided with a loss of momentum 
for the Sunni political leaderships in Lebanon. A general crisis of political 
representation of the Sunni community in Lebanon began in the second half of the 
1980s. There had traditionally not been specific political parties for Sunnis in 
Lebanon.154 Sunnis were coreligionists of the Ottomans and saw themselves as a 
majority in the broader Arab Middle East. Political leaders of the Sunnis were 
notables and therefore usually not activist, although they supported the Palestinian 
cause. During the civil war, Sunnis in Lebanon had generally speaking not enrolled 
in sectarian militias. Sunni notables did not participate in the war, but were 
mediators, while the urban poor fought for the PLO in alliance with left-wingers 
from other Lebanese sects. An exception was the aforementioned Islamic Tawhid 
movement in Tripoli.  
 The crisis of political representation of Sunnis began with the evacuation of the 
PLO from Lebanon in the 1982-83 period. This weakened the Lebanese Sunni 
community relative to other Lebanese sects. The two exclusively Sunni militias in 
Lebanon, allied with Fatah, al-Murabitun in Beirut and Tawhid in Tripoli, were 
both crushed by Syria and its allies. Syria subsequently helped Hizbullah gain 
control of the frontline with Israel. After 1985, 90 per cent of the so-called 
resistance acts against Israel were Hizbullah’s work.155 Arab nationalism lost its 
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impetus. The PLO began negotiation with Israel, and Hamas was patronised by 
Syria and Iran. Lebanese Sunnis no longer had a militant cause. Sunnis became 
jealous of Hizbullah and began to see political Shi‘ism as their main source of 
alterity. 
 Sunni leaders were not awarded control over an institution of state patronage 
they could use to consolidate their leadership, such as the Ministry of the Displaced 
People controlled by Jumblatt and the Council of the South, controlled by Nabih 
Berry. All these factors made it difficult for new Sunni leaders to emerge during 
the 1990-2005 period. Sunni urban poor quarters were heavily penetrated by the 
Syrian intelligence. Sunni leaders had lost touch with the population during the 
war. The new leaders were nouveaux riches businessmen with little historical 
legitimacy – or little legitimacy at all. They were patronised by Syrian intelligence, 
which vetoed all those electoral candidates of whom it disapproved. Loyalty 
increasingly became transactional. Some attributed the crisis of Sunni political 
representation in Lebanon to Syrian policies and argued that Damascus had a 
specific Sunni policy in Lebanon, to curb the autonomy of Lebanese Sunnis for 
domestic political reasons. Rougier relates the Syrian ‘preventive repression’ in 
North Lebanon to the large Sunni majority in the region.156  
 Certain aspects of Syria’s policies indicated that Syria followed an anti-Sunni 
policy in Lebanon. Specific Syrian arrangements during the 1980s and 1990s 
disfavoured the Lebanese Sunni community, and particularly, in Tripoli. For 
instance, the Tripartite Damascus agreement signed in 1985 between the three 
militia-leaders Walid Jumblatt, Elie Hobeiqa and Nabih Berry left out the Sunnis 
and the Palestinians.157 Moreover, during the 1990s, no institution of patronage was 
allocated to any Sunni politician in Tripoli. Asad feared that Sunni politicians 
might consolidate a political leadership at odds with Syria. Therefore, the Syrian 
regime made it clear to PM Rafiq Hariri that Tripoli was theirs and not a territory 
he could attempt to penetrate politically. 
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 Syria also continued to give strong political support to Lebanon’s Alawis, 
against the Sunnis. In 1991, two parliamentary seats were created for the Alawi 
minority in North Lebanon. Ali Eid obtained one, but was replaced with a figure 
more acceptable to Tripoli’s Sunnis in 1996.158 However, Syria did have many 
allies among the Sunnis in Tripoli, in particular traditional Sunni leaders from the 
bourgeois classes. While the Sunni urban poor were excluded from institutional 
politics in the 1990s and 2000s, traditional, secular politicians gained power in the 
Lebanese system. Few, if any, Tripolitanian MPs during the 1990 period opposed 
Syria.159 This was because the Syrian intelligence vetoed all electoral candidates 
they opposed. This occurred during a period where Lebanese electoral candidates 
had to pay bribes to Syrian intelligence to appear on electoral list. This practice was 
widely known and contributed to discrediting electoral politics among the 
Lebanese.160  
 Despite the alignment between Sunni leaders and Syria at the surface, there 
were signs that many Sunnis were uneasy with the Syrian practices. One tell-tale 
came already in 1992, when Ahmad Fakhr al-Din, the brother of the leader of the 
Tripoli Resistance, who had been supported by Syrian intelligence, presented 
himself for parliamentary elections. Anonymous flyers were distributed in Tripoli’s 
poor quarters against the Fakhr al-Din brothers with the slogan, ‘Do not forget the 
Tebbaneh massacre.’. In 1996, Samir Frangié, the politician from Zgharta, obtained 
12, 000 votes from Tripoli, a third of his total votes in the electoral district. 161 That 
was a high number, particularly compared to Omar Karami’s 14,000 votes in 
Tripoli. Frangié succeeded because he allied himself with one of Khalil Akkawi’s 
former comrades-in-arms and because he represented a line antagonistic to the 
Syrian regime. Another indication of Tripolitanian opposition to Syria was that 
Rafiq Hariri became very popular in Tripoli after he began to oppose the Syrian 
regime in the 2003-2004 period.  
                                                
158 ‘Nouvelle crise, vieux demons, p. 6. 
159 Although Misbah al-Ahdab joined the Bristol gathering in 2004, he had, as other Tripolitanian 
MPs, been forced to cooperate with the Syrian intelligence earlier. 
160 Interview, Samir Frangié, Beirut, June 2012. 
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 The above could indicate that Syria was not necessarily afraid of Islamists, 
because it was so easy to manipulate them. Syria was more afraid of the emergence 
of a strong and independent political Sunni leaders in the Levant region, with 
international contacts and which could give ideas to Syria’s Sunnis. Examples of 
such strong and independent leaders could be Yasser Arafat’s Fatah (in the 1980s), 
Rafiq Hariri (until 2005) and his son, Saad Hariri (after 2005). Yet, the focus on 
confessionalism should not be over-rated. It should be combined with the economic 
motivations, discussed in the next section. 
 
The Syrian-Lebanese informal economy 
Until now the discussion has implied that the greater Syrian control of north 
Lebanon, occurred as a result of a Syrian plan, because Syria feared Sunni Fatah 
activists or Sunni Islamists in Tripoli. A competing hypothesis may be that Syrian-
Lebanese ties developed without a political plan, as a result of the joint interests in 
the war economy. In other words, the Asad regime had no plan to control Tripoli 
more intrusively, but officers in the Syrian army developed particular economic 
interests in north Lebanon. During the Syrian tutelage, trans-state economic ties 
created overlapping interests between the Syrian regime, Syrian merchants, and 
Lebanese merchants. It was a win-win situation for most parties and contributed to 
consolidating Syrian tutelage. The big loser was the Lebanese state, whose 
revenues shrank by half over 10 years. 162  The Syrian-Lebanese networks 
introduced new norms in Tripoli, where short-term profit became more important 
than sustainable economic policies aiming at job creation. Thus, the Syrian-
Lebanese networks created a new “moral community” in North Lebanon, which 
competed with the former Islamic and anti-imperialistic values of Tripolitanian 
Sunnism.163 A new Syrian-Lebanese economic entrepreneurial class emerged. 
 Because of differences in climate, vegetation, and natural resources, the 
economies of Syria and Lebanon had always been complimentary. Although 
custom tariffs were introduced in 1950, trans-border economic exchange grew 
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during the 1960s, especially in the informal sector: After the beginning of the 
nationalisations of the Ba‘ath party in the 1960s, Lebanon was increasingly used as 
a backyard for Syria’s own informal sector. Syrian capital fled to Lebanon.164 The 
imbrications of the Syrian and the Lebanese economies reached its peak during the 
Syrian tutelage, when most of the Lebanese economy fell under Syrian control. The 
main reason for this was that the Syrian economy was hit by a severe crisis in the 
1980s, when purchasing power fell drastically. 165 The country experienced a 
foreign exchange bankruptcy, and was forced to drastically reduce imports.166 Few 
commodities could be found at Syrian official markets, yet everything could be 
found on the black markets. Control over strategic sectors in the Lebanese 
economy became crucial to the survival of the Syrian economy, and regime, in the 
period. 
 Syrian business entrepreneurs in Lebanon, with connections to the army and the 
regime, invested in specific industries, of which there was a shortage inside Syria 
proper. For instance, a large banking sector was developed in Zahleh between 1983 
and 1984. 167  The Lebanese economic space was important for those social 
categories who came to matter the most for the Asad regime in the 1990s and 
2000s: army officers, who controlled large parts of the Lebanese economy; 
Damascene merchants, courtiers, and intermediaries;168 and, from the late 1980s, a 
new Syrian class of business entrepreneurs linked to the regime.169 Syria initially 
saw the Lebanese economic bourgeoisie as a competitor, and not a partner to its 
own businesses. 170 Yet, as the Syrian presence in Lebanon lasted, Lebanese 
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entrepreneurship was compelled to not compete with, but to complement, the 
expanding Syrian private sector. 171 
 
Smuggling and trafficking in North Lebanon 
During the war, militia leaders and other war profiteers enriched themselves 
through illegal construction, real-estate speculation, export of refined products of 
cannabis and the opium poppy produced in the Beqa‘a, money raised from illegal 
taxes imposed on the civilians and on goods passing through the ports controlled by 
various militias.172 The development of the war economy is one of the central 
reasons for the durability of the Lebanese war. The war economy made the militias 
richer and less dependent on external support. 
 The war economy in North Lebanon mattered to Syrian army officers, because 
they controlled a greater share than elsewhere. In coordination with the warring 
Lebanese militias, they were able to control key infrastructure, including the port, 
the refinery in Beddawi and the Chekka cement works. The cement works was 
initially controlled by Frangié’s Marada militia and constituted the main source of 
the revenues of the latter.173 It became a particularly important recipient of Syrian 
investments because Syria itself lacked construction materials at the time.174 The 
oil refinery was managed by a group of Lebanese politicians and businessmen, in 
coordination with the Syrian army. Elements of Ali Haydar’s Wahdat Khassa 
[Special Units] were based inside the refinery.175  
 Tareq Fakhr al-Din, the Syria-linked Sunni businessman, also had a central 
role. In the 1980s, he was given economic privileges in exchange for establishing 
the Tripoli Resistance, a militia funded and armed by the Syrian intelligence. The 
participation of the Tripoli Resistance in the massacre in Bab al-Tebbaneh soon 
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became a taboo among many Sunnis in Tripoli, who only remembered the Alawi 
responsibility. Fakhr al-Din became a respectable businessman, and his “Palma” 
beach resort, built up with war profits and drug money in the 1980s without a 
construction permit, quickly became one of the most popular in Tripoli.  
 The port of Tripoli, controlled by the Karami family, was the second largest in 
Lebanon176 and used for hashish smuggling towards Turkey. It was in the early 
1970s a major route for PLO supplies and reinforcement, and this continued more 
covertly during the Syrian presence.177 However, the high number of taxes and 
impositions made it expensive, and other ports were opened north of Tripoli. 178 
These were used for the smuggling of cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, and electrical 
domestic appliances towards Syria. During a short period in the 1980s, the 
Minqara-led branch of the Tawhid movement seized control over the port,179 in 
coordination with Rifa‘at al-Asad and his son Firas.180 The royalties from the port 
made Minqara a very wealthy man 181  and helped his militia gain financial 
independence.182 Mustafa Allouche, an anti-Syrian and anti-Islamist political leader 
in Tripoli, estimates lost taxes to a value of 600 million dollars.183  
 Smuggling between Syria and Lebanon had existed since the creation of 
borders between the countries, even during the customs union, which lasted until 
1950. 184 It was amplified by the growing differentiation of the two economies in 
the 1960s. During the civil war, Akkar became the passageway between Syria and 
Lebanon for smuggling of construction materials, electrical domestic, and 
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foodstuffs.185 Because of the wartime isolation of Tripoli from Beirut, merchants 
began importing directly through the port of Tripoli, instead of through Beirut.186 
They developed relations of confidence with Syrian traders on the other side of the 
border, who smuggled the goods using small pick-ups.187 Smuggling took place 
everywhere, at all passage points. One route went through the village of Madaya, 
just south of al-Zabadani and near the Masn‘a border, which developed into an 
important village of cross-border traffic. Smugglers also passed from north 
Lebanon and along the Syrian coast, through Masyaf and Tartus. There were more 
than 50 clandestine ports in North Lebanon and on the Syrian coastline, where one 
embarked goods on the sea, in arrangement with the customs officials. If they 
refused to let goods pass, smugglers could kill them. One passage point was 
controlled by a man called Hassan Makhluf, known to do “happy hours” where 
smugglers passed in exchange for a financial compensation.188  
 The trafficking arrangement benefited Syrian army officers and their friends, 
who imposed regularised taxes for vans and trucks.189 The same figures as those 
controlling Tripoli’s port and refinery were also important in the trafficking 
business. Fakhr al-Din and his brother, Ahmad, trafficked aluminium, wood and 
iron purchased from pirates,190 in addition to drugs. Jamil al-Asad’s two sons, 
Fawaz and Munzar, played leading roles in the lucrative smuggling of electronics 
and consumer goods from Lebanon towards Syria and Turkey. 191  Fawaz, a 
corporate lawyer in a leather jacket who had bought all of his diplomas, had 
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already accumulated wealth through racketeering in Latakia.192 Fawaz and Munthar 
al-Asad were known for extolling and working with Tripoli’s businessmen.193  
 Since Tripoli was geographically close to Syria, and in particular to Latakia 
where both men lived, personal links developed between Tripoli’s businessmen and 
Jamil al-Asad’s sons. Syrian army officers became heavily involved in trafficking 
and contraband of stolen goods. Army commanders did not crush these practices, 
but gave army officers and soldiers the opportunity to resort to corruption, theft, 
and even vandalisation for personal enrichment or power purposes.194 For many 
Lebanese, this reflected the character of the Damascus regime as a military-
mercantile crony coalition, which used power as a source of personal 
enrichment.195 Thus, for the Syrian military constituency, the rent from illicit 
activities in Lebanon provided an alternative to oil-rent. 196 The petroleum sector 
had between the mid-1970s and mid-1980s constituted 70 per cent of the value of 
Syria’s total export value, but declined afterwards.197 One particularly lucrative 
sector was the booming drug trade, which benefited all sides of the conflict, and 
which linked the Lebanese militias up with European and Eastern mafias.  
 Most of the drug passed through the port of Beirut and and transported towards 
Europe, but the port of Tripoli was used for hashish smuggling towards Turkey.198 
Rifa‘at al-Asad and his son Firas levied heavy taxes on this traffic.199 Fakhr al-Din 
gained most of his fortune from wartime drug trade.200 Drugs also passed from the 
Beqa‘a to Tell Qalakh and Homs. Opium- and cannabis traffickers and merchants 
were often members of Lebanese political parties or militias, who used opium to 
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finance warfare and exchanged drugs for weapons from the European and Eastern 
mafias.201 As with the case of all other smuggling and war economy activity, 
warring militia leaders cooperated in smuggling and dispatching drugs, which 
flowed unrestricted through all frontlines without difficulties.202  
 
Lebanese dependence on the Syrian-Lebanese networks  
Economic interaction reaffirmed the strong social and historical links between 
Tripoli and its Syrian hinterland, mainly Homs, Tartus and Latakia. The same 
families were present on both sides of the international border, and in the period of 
the Syrian tutelage, children in certain villages in Akkar near the border went to 
school in Syria, where enrolment fees were considerably lower. 203  Another 
dimension of the complementarity between the two economies was the dependence 
of the Syrian workforce on the Lebanese labour market. Tripoli received a 
particularly high number of the Syrian migratory workers. Many were ambulant 
sellers, who gathered around the Abu Ali River. 204 Syrian workers numbered up to 
a million in Lebanon and made up between 20 and 40 per cent of the Lebanese 
workforce. They helped alleviate unemployment and poverty in Syria proper.205 
Contractors in Lebanon depended on their cheap labour. However, Lebanese 
labourers were put out of work by their Syrian counterparts, who did not pay taxes 
in Lebanon. 
 Lebanese entrepreneurs became increasingly dependent on Syria in the 1990s. 
They benefited from the opening of the Syrian economy and banking sector in the 
1990s, and obtained licences to operate in Syria. Endorsement of the Syrian regime 
also became necessary to do business on a large-scale within Lebanon.206 Indeed, 
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those entrepreneurs, who came to dominate Lebanese economy in the after-war era, 
were close to the Syrian regime and army. In Tripoli, the joint ventures between 
Syrian military elites and Tripolitanian businessmen developed new patterns of 
sociability. Syrian military officers became close to Tripoli’s elites, and, as 
elsewhere in Lebanon, exchanged visits, and met for lunches and drinks.207 The 
wives of the Syrian military officers became friends with the wives of Tripolitanian 
political elites and businessmen.208 
 Smuggling, illegal construction, and other parasitic activities helped create a 
new class of nouveaux riches Lebanese, and Tripolitanians, during the war. A 
considerable number of northern MPs of the 1990s had gained their fortune from 
trafficking activities that had begun during the war. Common interests developed 
as a result of these trans-state economic ties, and a network of actors favourable to 
a Syrian “solution” in Lebanon emerged.209 This new and growing Syro-Lebanese 
entrepreneurial elite consolidated Syrian control over Lebanon. It included central 
figures in the political establishment; others were businessmen who entered the 
political arena in the late 1990s.  
 Najib Miqati, who served as Lebanese Prime Minister in 2005 and between 
2011 and 2013, is one example. He entered politics in 1998 as Minister of Public 
Works and Transport and was elected MP in 2000. A considerable part of Miqati’s 
fortune was earned in the mobile phone industry in Syria and Lebanon.210 In both 
cases, favourable Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contracts 211  were obtained 
through the close friendship with governmental caretakers, PM Rafiq Hariri in 
Lebanon and Bashar al-Asad and Rami Makhlouf in Syria.212 In 2002, Orascom 
was pushed out of Syriatel after a row with Rami Makhlouf. 213 The episode 
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revealed that it was difficult to operate in the telecommunications sector in Syria 
without the consent of the influential Makhloufs. Miqati was also given an 
important role when Hashim Minqara and Samir al-Hassan were released from 
prison in 2000, which helped the former gain Islamist votes in the 2000 legislative 
election. 
 Ahmad Hbous, the late businessman who took over the Alawi seat in 
parliament in 1996 from Ali Eid, also gained his fortune as a contractor in Syria 
and Lebanon. Other prominent members of the rising Syro-Lebanese bourgeoisie 
outside of Tripoli included Abdel-Halim Khaddam and Rafiq Hariri, who 
developed business partnerships during the 1990s and prior to the Syrian 
withdrawal.214 Rafiq Hariri aided Khaddam’s son to establish himself in business. 
Other less prominent actors were Lebanese bankers, on whom Syrian entrepreneurs 
relied because of the failure to liberalise banks in Syria. In the 2000s, when 
branches of Lebanese banks were opened in Damascus, the interdependence 
continued. 
 Hence, the control over Tripoli’s economy was a joint venture between the 
notable families of Tripoli and the Syrian military officers, and contributed to 
solidifying ties between the two. Local politicians were interwoven into the Syrian 
orbit to the extent that they constituted one social fabric. In the parliamentary 
elections of 1992, characterised by the Christian boycott, controlling candidates in 
the North helped the Syrian regime install a political system in favour of the Pax 
Syriana. The cooperation, shared economic benefits, and common interest in the 
perpetuation of Syrian influence in Lebanon helped modify norms and identities in 
both camps. A common moral community and a common interest-based ‘asabiyya 
were created.215 
 
Conclusion 
North Lebanon, unlike the south and the Beqa‘a, was not direct soil of the conflict 
with Israel and the motivations for Syrian control over Tripoli were not geo-
political. North Lebanon’s informal economy benefited Syrian military officers and 
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Lebanese merchants. The rise of common economic interests consolidated already 
existing family ties between North Lebanon and Tripoli’s Syrian hinterland. 
Moreover, the Asad regime had, for tactical, and not confessional, reasons 
developed a particular “Sunni policy” in Lebanon. The aim was to hinder the 
emergence of a popular Sunni za‘im, but also generally to fragment Lebanese 
society. The relationship with the Sunni Islamist movements in Tripoli was highly 
ambivalent. Contestation in Tripoli was the perfect excuse to perpetuate the Syrian 
presence.  
 Syrian policy makers held a very high degree of expertise on Lebanese 
geography and population, which helped them adapt concrete policies to each 
region. The knowledge of the Lebanese terrain was so intimate, and Syrian and 
Lebanese societies imbricated at so many layers – families, political elite, economy 
– that the presence of the Syrian army in Lebanon between 1976 and 2005 does not 
qualify as an occupation.216 The situation resembled that of the USSR protectorates 
in central European countries. The flexibility of Syrian policies expresses the 
exceptional Machiavellian political skills of President Hafiz al-Asad, who 
understood the weakness, insecurities, likes, and dislikes of his Lebanese 
collaborators and rivals and turned this know-how into a political instrument.217  
 The creation of common interests in North Lebanon explained why, even after 
the Syrian withdrawal, many Sunni elites remained close to Syrian decision 
makers. The exclusion of the Sunni urban poor from the same networks and the 
repressive Syrian policies vis-à-vis Sunni poor quarters in Tripoli, explained why 
poor Sunnis in Tripoli opposed Syria and supported the Hariri family against Syria.  
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3 
  Coping with Asad: Lebanese Prime Ministers’ Strategies 
Taku Osoegawa 
 
This article deals with Lebanese−Syrian relations during the period when the 
international isolation of Syria increased following the outbreak of the 2003 Iraq War. 
Although it is true that the international hostility towards Syrian President Bashar al-Asad 
has been attributed to his various domestic and foreign policies, the Western antagonism 
has been especially aggravated by his policies towards Hizbullah’s armament, the 
international tribunal and investigation of the assassination of former Lebanese Prime 
Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, and the Syrian uprising that started in March 2011. 
Consequently, Asad paid much attention to international diplomacy over these issues; 
however, at the same time, he kept a sharp eye on the actions and attitudes taken by the 
Lebanese government towards these three issues. This is not only because they have 
constituted main concerns among Lebanese politicians and indeed destabilised the 
country, but also because top Lebanese leaders have sometimes defied Damascus over 
them, which has further damaged Syria’s regional and international position. Against this 
background, this study primarily examines how Lebanese Prime Ministers Rafiq al-
Hariri, Fouad al-Siniora, Sa‘d al-Hariri, and Najib Miqati272 coped with the Asad regime 
over the issues of Hizbullah’s arms, the Hariri investigation and trial, and the Syrian 
uprising. Because the presidency was weakened, neutral or sometimes left unfilled, prime 
ministers were the closest approximations in the Lebanese case of  foreign policy 
decision-maker.  
 Among the five main sections followed by a conclusion, the first section examines a 
theoretical framework explaining the Lebanese−Syrian relations, while the second section 
provides a short historical background on the relations of the two countries. In the third, 
fourth, and fifth sections, the Lebanese prime ministers’ policies with regard to the three 
sensitive matters for Damascus are discussed respectively. 
                                                
272 The reason why among top Lebanese governmental leaders these prime ministers are figure in focus is 
owing to the increased power of Lebanon’s premiership as a result of the 1990 amendment of the Lebanese 
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Theoretical Explanation of Lebanese−Syrian Relations 
Arguably, ‘[a] state’s formation and its power position in the international arena are 
decisive in shaping its external relations’ (Osoegawa 2013: 6). Regarding the case of 
Lebanon, its state formation has not been unitary, and non-governmental actors in the 
state, mostly sectarian-based, have been generally powerful enough to threaten the 
government and still maintain strong transnational ties with more powerful states 
(including Syria273). This situation seems to deny the validity of studying the Lebanese 
government and its foreign policy, because external powers have penetrated into Lebanon 
and wielded considerable influence inside the country through domestic actors.  
 However, as this author elsewhere (2013) contends, Lebanon is not a simple puppet 
of Syria, and it is appropriate to talk about Lebanese policy towards Syria, although it is 
necessary to recognise the reservation that Lebanon’s menu of policy choice in relation to 
the Syrian regional middle power has been rather limited. Since Syria has managed to 
maintain trans-state relations with non-governmental actors in Lebanon, which have 
been, in most cases, opposed to the Lebanese government, its top leaders have had to 
simultaneously counter both external threats in terms of Lebanon’s disadvantageous 
power balance vis-à-vis Syria and internal threats from these Syrian-supported Lebanese 
non-governmental actors, the most important of which has been Hizbullah. Consequently, 
the theory of ‘omnialignment’ advocated by Harknett and Vandenberg (1997)274 could 
explain the Lebanese−Syrian relations, because their theory maintains that interrelated 
external and internal threats generally occur when externally powerful states support 
internal opposition groups, which should force states’ leaders to face and deal with 
multiple and various kinds of threats at once.  
 Harknett and Vandenberg (1997: 124−128) propose four strategies taken by a state’s 
leadership to cope with interrelated external and internal threats, i.e. ‘double balance’, 
‘balance−bandwagon’, ‘bandwagon−balance’, and ‘double bandwagon’, and deducing 
from their work it could be said that Lebanese Prime Ministers Rafiq al-Hariri, Siniora, 
Sa‘d al-Hariri, and Miqati had the following strategies for Lebanon in relation to Syria. 
First, the Lebanese could resist, by relying on Western, Saudi, and/or Israeli power, the 
Asad regime in order to contain Syrian-backed Lebanese non-governmental actors 
                                                
273 Ehteshami and Hinnebusch (1997) refers to Syria as one of the regional middle powers and defines the 
concept as states which are key players in their region, but which are treated as middle powers globally. 
274 Osoegawa (2013) terms Harknett and Vandenberg (1997)’s ‘omnialignment’ theory ‘complex realism’, 
because their theory is a modified or ‘complex’ version of realism. 
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(‘double balance’). Second, they could resist, with the help of Western, Saudi, and/or 
Israeli power, the Syrian regime as a perceived greater threat, while appeasing Syrian-
backed Lebanese non-governmental actors as a perceived less immediate threat 
(‘balance–bandwagon’). Third, they could appease the Syrian regime as a perceived less 
immediate threat, while resisting Syrian-backed Lebanese non-governmental actors as a 
perceived greater threat (‘bandwagon–balance’). Fourth, they could appease the Syrian 
regime in order to get support from Syrian-backed Lebanese non-governmental actors 
(‘double bandwagon’). 
 Because Syria has been internationally isolated in the wake of the 2003 Iraq War, it is 
reasonable to presume that Lebanese Prime Ministers would largely balance against 
Damascus, especially in the form of the ‘double balance’ strategy. In reality, they more 
often did not balance against the Asad regime and indeed bandwagoned with it, and 
indeed, ‘double bandwagoning’, was frequently undertaken by the Lebanese side in 
coping with the Syrian regime. 
 
Historical Background of Lebanese−Syrian Relations 
Following the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War in April 1975, Syria’s deep 
involvement in Lebanon started and the latter country was put under the former country’s 
hegemony until April 2005. During the civil war, while Syria occasionally sparked 
sectarian fighting for its own benefit, it also tried to contain the conflict so as not to give 
its main enemy, i.e. Israel, any cause for intervention in Lebanon, with Damascus 
viewing Lebanon as its ‘soft underbelly’ through which Israel could readily attack it from 
the West Although Syrian hegemony was sometimes challenged by Israel, Syria 
continued to exert a dominant influence on Lebanese soil and finally played an important 
role in terminating the civil war in October 1990. 
 As a result, Syrian hegemony in Lebanon was firmly established and later, with the 
conclusion of the Lebanese−Syrian Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation, and 
Coordination in May 1991, ‘legally’ consolidated. While the Ta’if Agreement, which was 
reached under the auspices of the Arab League in October 1989 to establish a new 
political order in Lebanon, had already ‘formalise[d] Lebanon’s “special” relations with 
Syria’ (Norton 1991: 461), the 1991 treaty ‘clearly favoured Syria and placed Lebanon in 
a rather disadvantageous position’ (Osoegawa 2013: 116). This is largely owing to the 
fact that, unlike the Ta’if Agreement, the treaty did not specify the duration and size of 
the Syrian army’s redeployment in Lebanon and made it possible for Damascus to 
continually postpone redeployment (Thompson 2002: 82).  
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 Given the dominant Syrian dominant in Lebanon, Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, 
who occupied the premiership for a total of 10 years from 1992 to 2004, generally took 
into consideration Syria’s political, economic, and/or military preferences and 
bandwagoned with Damascus in order to gain support of the Syrian-backed Lebanese 
non-governmental actors, such as Hizbullah, for his ambitious economic recovery 
programme for Lebanon, i.e. ‘Horizon 2000’. However, Hariri occasionally balanced 
against the Asad regime by either attempting to negotiate a security arrangement directly 
with the Israeli government during the 1990s or aligning himself more closely with the 
Western powers after 2003. As for the Israeli aspect, Hariri stated in February 1993 
Lebanon’s readiness to sign an agreement (although he denied the possibility of 
concluding a peace treaty) with Israel that would guarantee the implementation of UN 
Security Council Resolution 425, i.e. the withdrawal of the Israeli army from southern 
Lebanon (Norton 1997: 10). Later, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
proposed the so-called ‘Lebanon first’ option in July 1996, which promoted the 
Israeli−Lebanese peace tracks ahead of the Israeli−Syrian peace tracks, Hariri took an 
ambiguous attitude and did not explicitly reject the Israeli proposal (Osoegawa 2013: 
141−142).  
 On the other hand, after Western, in particular US, hostility towards Syria was 
heightened in the wake of its objection to the US military action against Iraq in 2003,275 
Hariri exploited this change in the international dynamics of the Middle East. Amidst the 
unfavourable international wind for Damascus, Hariri worked with US President George 
W. Bush and French President Jacque Chirac to pass an anti-Syrian UN Security Council 
Resolution No. 1559. ‘The resolution, passed on 2 September 2004, called for Syria to 
halt its interference in Lebanon’s internal affairs and fully withdraw from the country and 
for Hizbullah and Palestinian groups in Lebanon to disarm’ (Osoegawa 2013: 104). 
 
Lebanese Policies on Hizbullah’s Weapons 
Before exploring the Lebanese–Syrian relations over the issue of Hizbullah’s armament, 
the strategic importance of the Shi‘a organisation for the Asad regime must be briefly 
discussed. With Syrian hegemony in Lebanon consolidating after the end of the civil war 
in 1990, the Syrian regime began to disarm local militias in Lebanon. However, 
Damascus permitted Hizbullah to maintain a military presence in southern Lebanon 
                                                
275 The Syrian objection to the Iraq War was largely due to its concern that US success in Iraq would lead 
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because the Israeli-backed South Lebanese Army (SLA), as well as the Israeli army, was 
still active in the region. In return, ‘Hizbullah was required to coordinate its military 
activities to serve Syria’s regional policy, especially towards Israel’ (Osoegawa 2013: 
111). 
 From 1992 to 1996, when the Labour government in Israel seriously negotiated with 
the Asad regime over a peace agreement, the Syrian side largely restricted Hizbullah’s 
military activities (Zisser 2001: 146−147). However, when the Israeli Likud cabinet led 
by Prime Minister Netanyahu from 1996 to 1999 pushed Damascus aside by advocating 
the ‘Lebanon first’ option, it is probable that the Syrians encouraged Hizbullah’s attacks 
against the Israeli army and the SLA to put pressure on the Israelis. This is supported by 
the fact that the mounting deaths of Israeli military personnel stationed in southern 
Lebanon greatly influenced the perceptions of Prime Minister Ehud Barak, who assumed 
Israel’s premiership in May 1999, and had insisted on the army’s early departure from 
southern Lebanon during his election campaign. 
 While the Israeli army’s unilateral withdrawal from the south in May 2000 threatened 
Hizbullah’s raison d’être, the Asad regime still needed a surrogate force to put pressure 
on the Israeli army to evacuate from the Golan Heights. Finally, the Syrian and Lebanese 
authorities raised the pretext that the so-called ‘Shabaa Farms’, located in the 
Israeli−Lebanese−Syrian border area, remained Israeli-occupied Lebanese territory, 
despite the Israeli and international recognition of the area as part of the Golan Heights. 
This made it possible for Hizbullah to remain armed and for Damascus to potentially use 
the organisation’s weapons to bargain over the Israeli army’s withdrawal from the Golan 
Heights. The Syrian regime has never pressured Hizbullah to disarm; however there were 
some Lebanese and international calls for the organisation to do so.  
 Despite the strategic importance for Syria of Hizbullah’s arms, Prime Minister Rafiq 
al-Hariri did not have much sympathy for its military activities and attempted to restrain 
them in order to acquire international aid and investment necessary for his ‘Horizon 
2000’. Hariri thought Hizbullah’s armed resistance against Israel had the potential to hurt 
his economic recovery programme, and in February 2001 Hizbullah indeed launched 
military operations one day after he had given assurances of Lebanon’s suitable 
investment climate to international businessmen in Paris (Blanford 2001: 9). When the 
Bush administration applied more pressure on ‘terrorist organisations’ after the 11 
September attacks and added Hizbullah to its ‘terrorist list’ in early October (Middle East 
International 26 October 2001: 19), it might have been anticipated that Hariri would 
assume a hostile attitude towards Hizbullah. Although Hariri contributed to the passage 
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of UN Security Council Resolution 1559, according to Blanford (2006: 104), he did so 
mainly to put pressure on the Syrian regime not to extend the term of pro-Syrian 
President Emile Lahoud, with whom he had an unfriendly relationship,276 and ‘could not 
publicly support the resolution because of the...clauses demanding the disarming of 
Hizbullah and a full Syrian withdrawal’. Consequently, it is possible to say that while 
Hariri’s relations with Damascus further worsened over the proposed extension of 
Lahoud’s presidential mandate, Hariri did not intend to strip Syria of one of its important 
strategic assets vis-à-vis Israel, i.e. Hizbullah’s weapons.  
 How can Harknett and Vandenberg (1997)’s ‘omnialignment’ theory explain Hariri’s 
behaviour towards the Asad regime? Although it is true that Hariri aligned himself with 
Western governments to contain Syrian-backed Lahoud, a manifestation of a ‘double 
balance’, his balancing against Damascus was temporary. Indeed, from August to 
September 2004 Hariri’s cabinet and parliamentary bloc finally agreed to the amendment 
of the Lebanese constitution, which made it possible for Lahoud to serve another three-
year presidential term (The Daily Star 30 August 2004; The Daily Star 4 September 
2004). Hariri’s avoidance of all-out confrontation with the Syrian regime over 
Hizbullah’s arms and this last instance of ‘cooperation’ with the Syrian regime over the 
extension of Lahoud’s term277 meant that he still relied on Damascus to regulate these 
pro-Syrian actors, i.e. Hizbullah and Lahoud, hence was pursuing a  strategy of ‘double 
bandwagon’. 
 After the 30-year Syrian hegemony in Lebanon ended in 2005,  successive Lebanese 
cabinets continued to formally recognise the legitimate right of Hizbullah’s armed 
resistance against Israel in their policy statements. Prime Ministers Siniora, Sa‘d al-
Hariri, and Miqati, of whom the former two were leaders in the anti-Syrian March 14 
Coalition, may have anticipated that taking into consideration Hizbollah’s strategic 
importance for Syria could also have lead to the pro-Syrian March 8 Coalition’s 
cooperation in future policies. Indeed, all the three Lebanese cabinets included ministers 
from the Hizbullah-led March 8 Coalition. The composition of the Siniora, Hariri, and 
Miqati cabinet led them to align themselves with Damascus over the arms issue in order 
to gain backing from the March 8 Coalition, and thus their policy amounted to ‘double 
                                                
276 After Hariri returned to the premiership in 2000 following the parliamentary elections during the 
summer, he had to consider Lahoud’s preferences when he formed his fourth and fifth cabinets. 
Furthermore, Hariri’s efforts to privatise Lebanon’s telecommunication and electricity sectors were blocked 
by the president himself and his close allies in the Hariri cabinets. 
277 It is widely believed that the Asad regime pressured Lebanese politicians to support the amendment. For 
one of the descriptions of the regime’s intimidation, see Harris (2006: 298−299). 
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bandwagoning’. However, at the same time Siniora indeed attempted to strip Hizbullah of 
the legitimacy of armed resistance. 
 First of all, it is important to recognise that the first Siniora cabinet (July 2005−July 
2008) had strong regional and international support, especially from the United States, 
France, and Saudi Arabia, which indeed provided a variety of economic and financial 
assistance to Lebanon. ‘In return for supporting the Siniora government, the international 
community, and in particular the United States, expected the Lebanese government to 
initiate steps leading to the disarmament of Hizb[u]llah’ (Najem 2012: 121). 
Accordingly, Siniora launched this course of action in July 2006 and again in May 2008 
in particular-- attempted  ‘double balancing’.  
 In the case of July 2006, immediately after the Hizbullah−Israeli Conflict started, 
Siniora revealed his cabinet’s intention to disarm Hizbullah by reaffirming Lebanon’s 
international commitment to expand the government’s authority to all of its territory (The 
Daily Star 14 July 2006). Since the conflict was triggered by Hizbullah (whose fighters 
entered Israeli territory to kidnap two Israeli soldiers), Lebanese, regional, and 
international criticism against the resistance organisation mounted during the initial 
period of the conflict. While Siniora endeavoured to exploit this unfavourable situation 
surrounding Hizbullah with the aim of achieving its disarmament, Israel’s continuous 
indiscriminate attacks on Lebanese infrastructure aroused harsh worldwide condemnation 
against Israel and boosted Hizbullah’s popularity inside and outside Lebanon (Khatib 
2014: 83−97). Because the widespread admiration for the Hizbullah made it impossible 
for Siniora to stand against the organisation, his disarmament proposal ended in failure, 
which was, needless to say, in Asad’s favour. Finally, although UN Security Council 
Resolution 1701 (which brought the conflict to an end) called for Hizbullah’s 
disarmament, the deployment of the Lebanese army to the south on the basis of the 
resolution was indeed realised, but in cooperation with, not against, Hizbullah which, 
although evacuating the immediate border area, still kept its arms (Barak 2009: 195). 
 Regarding the May 2008 case, ‘the Siniora cabinet called for steps aiming to close 
down Hizbullah’s secret, independent telecommunications network, which had been 
important for the organisation to conduct intelligence and military operations beyond the 
control of the Lebanese government’ (Osoegawa 2013: 168). Hizbullah reacted with a 
‘declaration of war’ against the cabinet (The Daily Star 9 May 2008), and members 
belonging to the resistance organisation and other political parties in the March 8 
Coalition began to attack properties relating to the March 14 Coalition. Although more 
than 100 Lebanese were killed during the one-week conflict, and although many 
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Lebanese feared the revival of a ‘civil war’ amidst the worst situation in Lebanon since 
the end of the civil war in 1990 (Najem 2012: 81), it seems that the Asad regime did not 
pressure Hizbullah to restrain its hostile activities in Lebanon. Finally, the cabinet 
decision to close down the telecommunications network, along with its decision to 
dismiss the head of security at Beirut’s Rafiq al-Hariri International Airport because of 
his close, ‘improper’ relations with the March 8 Coalition, was revoked (The Daily Star 
12 May 2008).  
 On the other hand, recognising that the weakness of the Lebanese army had justified 
Hizbullah’s arms possession, Siniora had a strong motive to strengthen the army. As one 
of the ways to support the pro-Western Siniora cabinet, US military aid to Lebanon was 
resumed in 2006 after a 10-year hiatus, and the total amount reached $410 million in 
2008 (Schenker 2009: 227). Although this US assistance was essential in the 2007 battle 
of the Lebanese army against the Fatah al-Islam, i.e. a radical Sunni Islamist group 
affiliated with al-Qa‘ida, its aid was confined to light weapons because of US fear that its 
provision of heavy weapons to the Lebanese army could lead to Hizbullah’s possession 
of these arms. Thus, while Hizbullah was not threatened by US military support of the 
Lebanese army, Siniora’s ‘double balance’ strategy—aligning himself with Washington 
in order to contain the Syrian-backed Hizbullah—inevitably worsened Lebanese−Syrian 
relations and had no noticable success.  
 
Lebanese Attitudes towards the Hariri Investigation and Tribunal 
After the assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in February 
2005, the International Independent Investigation Commission (IIIC) was established in 
April 2005 according to UN Security Council Resolution 1595, which defined ‘the 
assassination as a terrorist crime and called for a comprehensive inquiry to identify 
Hariri’s murderers’ (Harris 2006: 304). As a leading figure in the pro-Western, anti-
Syrian March 14 Coalition, and as a close associate when Hariri was alive, Prime 
Minister Siniora continued to cooperate with the Western-backed IIIC, which initially 
pointed its finger at the Asad regime for the Hariri assassination.278 In fact, Siniora 
permitted the Lebanese authorities, at the recommendation of the IIIC, to detain four top 
figures of the Lebanese security apparatus for involvement in the murder of Hariri in late 
August 2005. They were Major General Jamil al-Sayyid, former head of Sureté Générale; 
Major General ‘Ali al-Hajj, former director general of the Internal Security Forces; 
                                                
278 Damascus has categorically denied the allegation until today. 
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Brigadier General Raymond ‘Azar, former director general of military intelligence; and 
Brigadier General Mustafa Hamdan, commander of Lebanon’s Presidential Guard, all of 
whom played a key security role under Syrian hegemony in Lebanon until 2005 (The 
Daily Star 31 August 2005; Harris 2006: 309; Harris 2009: 68).279    
 Although Siniora frequently declared that Lebanon had a right to know the truth 
about Hariri’s  assassination and consequently stressed the necessity for supporting the 
IIIC’s activities, it seems impossible to neglect his intention to use the international 
investigation as a political tool. Regarding this point, Siniora might have calculated that 
the IIIC’s negative perception of the Asad regime further isolated and weakened Syria, 
which would, in effect, adversely affect the power of its Lebanese allies (Siniora’s 
domestic rivals), i.e. the March 8 Coalition in general and Hizbullah in particular. In 
defying Damascus and cooperating with Western governments, the Siniora cabinet 
continued, with the aim of containing these pro-Syrian actors, to ask the Security Council 
to extend the IIIC mandate at its periodic expirations, in what amounted to a strategy of 
‘double balancing’ in Harknett and Vandenberg (1997)’s ‘omnialignment’ theory. 
 Furthermore, and against the objections of the pro-Syrian March 8 Coalition,, the 
Siniora cabinet asked the UN to form an international tribunal to try those accused of the 
Hariri assassination on 12 December 2005 (Michel 2014: 14), and later voted for the UN 
draft stipulating the establishment of what has become the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) on 13 November 2006 (The Daily Star 14 November 2006). Accordingly, the STL 
was approved by UN Security Council Resolution 1757 on 30 May 2007 and finally 
started its work on 1 March 2009 (Tabbrah 2014: 40−42).  
 Damascus did not oppose the idea of establishing an international investigation and 
an international tribunal, and President Asad indeed expressed Syria’s intention to accept 
‘non-biased’ judgement of the STL (L’ Orient Le Jour 11/12 December 2010). However, 
the fact that Western initiative in the UN Security Council largely contributed to the 
establishment of the IIIC and STL Damascus came to see both of them as Western 
political tools to put pressure on the regime. Despite Syrian hostility, Prime Minister Sa‘d 
al-Hariri—the successor of Siniora and a son of Rafiq—strongly defended the legitimacy 
of the STL and supported its activities, yet initially also maintained good relations with 
Asad. They indeed met three times from December 2009 to May 2010 and reportedly 
agreed upon coordination in regional matters (The Daily Star 1 June 2010). Furthermore, 
                                                
279 The four generals were released in late April 2009 because of insufficient evidence; The Daily Star 30 
April 2009. 
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on 6 September 2010, Hariri publicly admitted it was a mistake to blame the 
assassination of his father on the Syrian regime (The Daily Star 7 September 2010).  
 Hariri’s alignment with Asad from December 2009 to September 2010 could be 
theoretically explained by the strategy of ‘double bandwagon’ in ‘omnialignment’ theory. 
It became widely believed in and outside Lebanon that the STL’s upcoming indictment 
would accuse Hizbullah members of involvement in the assassination,280 so it is probable 
that Hariri calculated that aligning himself with Damascus would lead to Hizbullah’s 
cooperation with the STL. In addition, the fact that the March 8 Coalition had 10 
ministers in his 30-member cabinet (L’ Orient Le Jour 10 November 2009) might have 
led Hariri to expect that good relations with Asad could gain the coalition’s support for 
his cabinet’s operation.  
 However, the March 8 Coalition in general and Hizbullah in particular continued to 
take a hostile view of the STL. Hasan Nasrallah, leader of Hizbullah, stated on 9 August 
2010 that the tribunal was politicised and part of an Israeli plot against the resistance 
organisation (Al-Safir 10 August 2010). Later, in the early morning of 18 January 2011, 
Hizbullah members organised a political demonstration showing its adamant rejection of 
the STL, which caused a panic among a portion of the Lebanese.  
 Since Damascus did not pressure Hizbullah to change its stance and insisted that 
Lebanon should terminate its cooperation with the STL, Hariri strengthened his ties with 
US President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy, and frequently 
visited these states from November 2010 to January 2011. In line with the strategy of 
‘double balancing’, Hariri aligned himself with the US and French authorities to contain 
Hizbullah, which consistently asked him not to support the STL. Finally, Hariri’s 
balancing against the Syrian regime led to the collapse of his cabinet on 12 January, 
which was triggered by the resignation of 10 ministers from the March 8 Coalition and 
one minister loyal to Lebanese President Michel Sulayman (The Daily Star 13 January 
2011; L’ Orient Le Jour 13 January 2011). 
 Prime Minister Miqati—the successor of Hariri—did not express clear support for the 
STL in the policy statement of his second cabinet, which angered Hariri who demanded 
that Miqati fully cooperate with the tribunal (The Daily Star 1 July 2011). As deduced 
from the strategy of ‘double bandwagon’, Miqati allied himself with Damascus over the 
STL to gain support from the March 8 Coalition, which had 18 ministers in the 30-
                                                
280 On 30 June 2011, the STL issued its indictment and arrest warrants against four Hizbullah members; 
The Daily Star 1 July 2011. 
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member cabinet (The Daily Star 14 June 2011; L’ Orient Le Jour 14 June 2011). Since 
the Western authorities regarded him as a man strongly affiliated with Hizbullah,281, it 
was almost impossible for Miqati to choose a policy of working together with 
Washington or Paris to contain the March 8 Coalition (a strategy of ‘double balance’). 
However, it is important to note that as a ‘neutral’ figure who formed his first cabinet in 
April 2005 to supervise the upcoming parliamentary elections amidst fierce antagonism 
between the March 8 and 14 Coalitions, Miqati took a middle ground : he did not disturb 
the STL’s activities and quietly  continued to pay Lebanon’s share of the annual funding 
for the tribunal. 
 
Lebanese ‘Dissociation Policy’ toward the Syrian Uprising 
Prime Minister Miqati officially declared Lebanon’s ‘dissociation policy’ regarding the 
Syrian uprising, and as Hokayem (2013: 134) pointed out, ‘[d]issociation received the 
much-needed acquiescence of key Western and Arab states, as there was consensus on 
the unique exposure of Lebanon, the structural weakness of the state, and the need to 
contain the regional spillover of the Syrian crisis.’ 
 However, because Lebanon is a country not only bordering Syria but also having 
deep-rooted interstate and transnational relations with the country, in practice it has been 
impossible for the Lebanese to maintain an attitude of ‘dissociation’ towards the Syrian 
uprising. Indeed, the March 8 Coalition has supported the Asad regime, and Hizbullah 
has sent its fighters to Syria to help the regime, which especially contributed to its 
recovery of two strategic points, i.e. Qusair and Yabroud. On the other hand, the March 
14 Coalition has supported opposition forces in Syria, and the Future Movement has sent 
money and weapons to the opposition.282 This support provided by the Future Movement 
has inevitably worsened the relationship between Sa‘d al-Hariri and President Asad. 
                                                
281 However, Miqati has been a prominent international businessman and seems to have had no close 
relationship with the resistance organisation. Reporting the 2009 parliamentary elections in Lebanon, where 
the fierce election campaign between the March 8 and 14 Coalitions took place, Lebanese newspapers 
described him as ‘independent’. See The Daily Star 9 June 2009; and L’ Orient Le Jour 9 June 2009. 
282 Unlike the case of Hizbullah, the reality of the support given by the Future Movement to the Syrian 
opposition is still not clear. However, it was reported in April 2011 that Jamal Jarrah, an MP from the 
Future Movement, was involved in financing and arming anti-Asad forces, although he dismissed the 
allegation (The Daily Star 14 April 2011). Later, in December 2012, Oqab Saqr—an MP from the Future 
Movement—was accused of providing arms and ammunition to Syrian rebels, and although the movement 
initially defended his involvement in these activities, he later denied it. For details, see The Daily Star 5 
December 2012 and 7 December 2012. 
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Damascus has consequently taken hostile attitudes towards the Future Movement and 
indeed issued arrest warrants for Hariri and Oqab Saqr, an MP from the movement, on 11 
December 2012 (The Daily Star 12 December 2012), after which Hariri called Asad a 
‘monster’ (The Daily Star 13 December 2012).  
 Amidst this domestic polarisation, how did Miqati deal with the Syrian uprising under 
the name of the dissociation policy? First of all, there is no doubt that the equally divided 
public opinion in Lebanon between ‘pro-Asad’ and ‘anti-Asad’ supporters, the politically 
‘neutral’ stance of Miqati, and the economic interdependency existing between Lebanon 
and Syria shaped his official stance of dissociation. On the other hand, in reality, because 
the majority of the Miqati cabinet were ministers affiliated with the March 8 Coalition, in 
order to keep its support, Miqati did not want to provoke the Asad regime, which could 
be seen as a strategy of ‘double bandwagoning.’ Consequently, although the March 14 
Coalition increasingly labelled Miqati’s dissociation policy as ‘pro-Asad’, it did not 
actively seek to remove him especially since the international community, including the 
USA and France, supported his stance in the name of Lebanon’s domestic stability,. 
 On the diplomatic scene, ‘Lebanon, which served as a member of the [UN Security 
Council] until late 2011, abstained and dissociated itself from UN statements critici[z]ing 
the Syrian government, and followed a similar approach at the Arab League’ (Hokayem 
2013: 133─134). In early August 2011, Lebanon decided to dissociate itself from a 
council statement condemning violence in Syria, although the other 14 member states 
approved the statement (The Daily Star 5 August 2011). Later, in October 2011 when the 
US and European Union coordinated efforts to pass a UN Security Council resolution 
warning that Syria could face sanctions if the regime did not stop its crackdown on the 
opposition and this was blocked by Russia and China, Lebanon and three other member 
states abstained (The Daily Star 5 October 2011). Furthermore, on 12 November, 
Lebanon voted against the Arab League’s decision to suspend Syria’s membership and 
impose political and economic sanctions on the country (The Daily Star 14 November 
2011; L’ Orient Le Jour 14 November 2011).  
 Because these policies were directed by pro-Syrian Foreign Minister ‘Adnan 
Mansur,283 leading figures in the March 14 Coalition such as Hariri bluntly criticised 
Mansur as a mouthpiece for the Asad regime. Furthermore, on 6 March 2013, Mansur 
‘called for the reinstatement of Syria’s membership in the Arab League at a ministerial 
meeting of the organi[s]ation in Cairo’ (The Daily Star 7 March 2013). In spite of 
                                                
283 Mansur is a veteran Shi‘a diplomat supported by the pro-Syrian Amal Movement. For details on his 
career, see The Daily Star 14 June 2011; L’ Orient Le Jour 14 June 2011; and As-Safir 14 June 2011.  
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Mansur’s clear violation of Miqati’s dissociation policy, and although he later urged 
ministers to uphold the policy (The Daily Star 14 March 2013), he did not seem to try to 
dismiss Mansur, who continued to retain the ministerial post until the cabinet resignation 
in March 2013.  
 On the domestic arena, a succession of the cross-border military operations conducted 
by the Syrian army not only damaged properties but also hurt and killed people on the 
Lebanese side of the border. However, Miqati initially tolerated the incursions of the 
Syrian army into Lebanese territory and hesitated to boost the presence of the Lebanese 
army on the border. Since Lebanon had not recognised the legitimacy of the anti-Asad 
Syrian National Council and the Syrian National Coalition,284 it seems that Miqati 
accepted, even though indirectly, Asad’s insistence that the Syrian military operations on 
Lebanese soil were aimed at ‘terrorists’. Indeed, the Syrian army captured militant 
Islamists having bases inside Lebanon, which was, because their presence was also a 
headache, beneficial for Lebanon. Consequently, it seems certain that the common 
interest existing between Lebanon and Syria to contain these Islamists prompted Miqati 
to acquiesce to the Syrian incursions into Lebanese territory. Furthermore, Miqati’s tacit 
understanding of the Syrian operations seemed to boost Hizbullah’s backing for him, 
since the resistance organisation not only supported the Asad regime but also battled 
against the  anti-Asad Islamists. 
 However, the increasing number of Lebanese casualties in the border area led Miqati 
to boost the presence of the army and accept further US military assistance.285 By doing 
so, Miqati aimed to secure the border and deal with sectarian violence in Lebanon 
encouraged by the Syrian uprising.286 Furthermore, in September 2012, Miqati—along 
with President Sulayman—began to complain to Damascus about the Syrian army’s 
operations on Lebanese soil and the resulting violation of its sovereignty (The Daily Star 
4 September 2012). Nevertheless, Miqati neither took provocative action against Syria 
such as appealing to the UN Security Council nor seemed to have any intention to use US 
                                                
284 Most Arab and Western states recognised the Syrian National Council as ‘a legitimate representative of 
Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change’ at the ‘Friends of Syria’ conference in Tunis on 24 February 
2012; The Daily Star 27 February 2012. After it was revealed that the Syrian National Council had not 
functioned as anticipated, these states contributed to another umbrella opposition body, i.e. the Syrian 
National Coalition, which was established on 11 November; The Independent 12 November 2012. 
285 It was reported that the total amount of US military assistance to the Lebanese army during the latter 
part of 2012 reached more than $140 million and the assistance included helicopters, armoured vehicles, 
and guns. For details, see The Daily Star 22 December 2012; and The Daily Star 8 January 2013. 
286 Especially in Tripoli, gunmen from the anti-Asad Sunnis and those from the pro-Asad ‘Alawis 
continued to exchange fire from May 2012 to April 2014. 
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involvement to contain Hizbullah. Thus, it is possible to say that over issues relating to 
the Syrian uprising, Miqati abstained from balancing against Syria or its Lebanese allies. 
The reason why he avoided open confrontation with Damascus can be primarily 
explained by the identification of his ‘partners’ in the cabinet, i.e. the March 8 Coalition 
in general and Hizbullah in particular, with the Syrian regime. 
 
Conclusion 
Lebanese Prime Ministers Rafiq al-Hariri, Siniora, Sa‘d al-Hariri, and Najib Miqati all 
had to deal with the three issues which were pivotal to the survival of the Asad regime 
and the success of its strategies, i.e. Hizbullah’s weapons, the IIIC and STL activities, 
and the Syrian uprising. With important exceptions, their policies were largely shaped by 
the anticipation that aligning themselves with Damascus would ensure  support from or 
ward off the hostility of the pro-Syrian Lebanese actors, notably Hizbullah.  
 However, Rafiq al-Hariri temporarily balanced against the Syrians by playing an 
important role in the passge of Resolution 1559 with the aim of containing President 
Lahoud. Later, as leading figures in the anti-Syrian March 14 Coalition, Siniora (in 
particular from July 2005 to July 2008) and Sa‘d al-Hariri (in particular from November 
2010 to January 2011) took provocative policies against the Asad regime.  Their main 
aim was to use closer relations with Washington and Paris to contain the March 8 
Coalition in general and Hizbullah in particular. Thus, the hostile policies of the three 
prime ministers towards the Syrian regime could be explained by the strategy of ‘double 
balance’ in  ‘omnialignment’ theory. In the long run, Siniora’s balancing contributed to 
the deterioration of Lebanese−Syrian relations during his reign and proved in the end to 
be unsustainable. Prime Ministers after his tenure therefore returned to strategies of 
bandwagoning. This reflects the relative weakness of Lebanon as a foreign policy actor 
for whom balancing was only a viable option when they could exploit strong external 
support against Syria. 
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